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ABSTRACT
The traffic movements in the Straits ofMalacca (SOM) have been ever increasing
over the pass few years resulting in numerous marine casualties that have caused serious
concern to the Government ofMalaysia. Current characteristics of navigation in the SOM
present a potential major catastrophe. The first hypothesis is that there is a positive
relationship between traffic movement and the number of marine casualties . Thus, an
increase in traffic movement will result in an increased ofrisk of marine casualties. The
second hypothesis is that the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) did not change the overall
trend of marine casualties that occurred in the SOM before and after its implementation in
May 1, 1981. The results of this study do not support the first hypothesis, but does
support the second hypothesis. Although the open North Sea Area (in Europe) is among
the busiest sealanes in the world, the frequency of its marine casualty rates is lower than
that of the SOM. The TSS that is currently in place in the SOM is found to be no longer
able to effectively cope with increasing traffic movements. Trends in marine casualties in
the SOM remain the same both before and after the implementation of the TSS. The need
to extend the existing TSS to cover the entire Straits is long overdue and other routing
systems such as Vessel Traffic Services are needed to supplement the current TSS . The
introduction of"Port Rationalization" in Malaysia will be an effective way to ease and
reduce Malaysian generated traffic. This will in tum reduce the risk and also the number
of marine casualties in the SOM .
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Statement ofProblem
Traffic movements in the Straits ofMalacea (SOM) have been increasing over the
past few years. Despite the implementation ofa Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS),
beginning on May 1, 1981, increased traffic movements have resulted in an increase in the
number of marine casualties. A large percentage of the traffic movements in the SOM
consists of large tankers carrying crude oil enroute to Japan. Thus, the potential of a major
environmental catastrophe resulting from a massive oil pollution incident is present.
The purpose of this study was to examine and assess the level of navigational
safety in the congested SOM. It has been more than a decade since the TSS was
implemented in the SOM, and yet no study has been accomplished on its effectiveness.
Besides studying the relationship between traffic movements and the number of marine
casualties, this study will also attempt to examine the effectiveness of the TSS in the
SOM.
Before making any attempt to examine the affect of traffic movements and the
effectiveness of the TSS, this study first explored the legal status of the SOM. It looked at
what actions have been taken by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
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(UNCLOS III) to enhance the safety of navigation in the SOM. After completing an
analysis to test the hypotheses, using UNCLOS III as a guideline, this study makes
appropriate recommendations to improve the safety of navigation in the SOM.
Hypotheses
This study encompassed two broad areas, namely legal status and safety of
navigation. There are two hypotheses presented in this paper, and both address the safety
of navigation. The first hypothesis is that a positive relationship exists between traffic
movements and the number of marine casualties. Thus, increases in traffic movements will
result in an increased risk of marine casualties. A second hypothesis is that the TSS does
not have any affect on the trend of the marine casualties within the SOM. Therefore, it is
suggested that there are no significant changes in the trend of the marine casualties before
and after the implementation of TSS in the SOM on May 1, 1981.
History of the Straits ofMalacca
For centuries, the SOM has served as an important sea-link used by both sailors
and navigators of different nationalities such as the Chinese, Greeks, Romans, Persians,
and Arabs. Its strategic geographical location has made it an object of international rivalry
since the fifteenth century. As early as 1509, the Portuguese arrived in Malacca and sailed
through the Straits to establish their settlement in Macao, on the southern coast of China.
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Later in 1641, the Dutch crossed the Straits and settled in Batavia. In the late
eighteenth century, the British were interested in gaining control ofthe SOM because it
provided a route to China. During this period, a great rivalry went on between the Dutch
and the British for control of the SOM.
In 1819, Sir Thomas Stamford Raflles purchased Singapore, an island at the
southern end of the SOM. Later in 1824, the British-Dutch rivalry ended and an
agreement was signed in which Britain agreed to safeguard the SOM and keep it open to
the Dutch and other friendly nations.
The historic importance of the SOM can be seen from the fact that the history of
the region has centered on the history of the Straits. The Port of Malacca, after which the
Straits were named, has been the focal point of power struggles throughout the centuries.
The Straits have always been a part of the great sea route between India and China.
The SOM served as an international waterway as far back as year 2000 B.C.
According to Sington (1969), "Indian penetration began about 100 B.C. and
superimposed Hinduism, Buddhism, and later Islam on the earlier animism of the Malay
people who came out of Central Asia in about 9000 B.C. and 2000 B.C." Shaw (1973)
noted that the Straits were "functioning as a natural international canal used by all nations
from time immemorial, as early as by the Romans in the second century AD., according to
records." It has been noted that 1-Tsing, a famous Chinese historian and traveler, once
used the SOM. Tome Pires, the Portuguese voyager, stated, "Whoever is Lord ofMalacca
has his hand on the throat of Venice" (pathmanathan, 1975) .
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During the eighth century A.D., the Kings ofSrivijaya, in Sumatra, conquered the
Malay Kingdom and established supremacy over the SOM. In the fifteenth century, the
Malacca Dynasty conquered the whole Malay Peninsula and much of Sumatra. The SOM
was then the battle field for conquering nations, and its history records a constant struggle
between kingdoms and pirate groups. "No one was safe, all classes and nationalities were
treated alike, and almost daily came in reports of vessels pirated and burnt, and crews
murdered, and the cargoes stolen A real panic was established, and not without
cause Manned and armed boats were sent away, for days and nights together, in
search of the pirates" (Swettenham, 1955). Meanwhile, the Straits itself was an object for
power struggles.
The Portuguese governed Malacca from 1511 to 1641. They enforced restrictions
on vessels passing through the Straits, requiring all vessels to call at Malacca to pay a toll
(Kennedy, 1962). The Portuguese were in turn followed by the Dutch to whom Portugal
lost the lucrative trade beyond India in the seventeenth century (Sington, 1969). During
the Dutch dominion from 1641, the government exercised de facto sovereignty over the
whole SOM. It interfered with intercourse and trade within the Straits, sometimes even
denying passage of ships within the Straits, which brought loud and strong protests from
the British (Tarling, 1962) . Basically, the Dutch established a quasi-order for monopoly of
this sea route.
After Holland and France lost a war against Britain, in 1795, the British took
possession ofMalacca, and controlled the SOM. The 1802 Treaty of Amiens provided for
the restoration of former Dutch colonies taken over by Britain, and contained no
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stipulation guaranteeing free navigation through and/or within the Straits . However, this
Treaty did not come into effect until 1814, owing to hostilities that still existed between
the two nations . The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1813 granted all Dutch shipping a right of
free access to British ports. The British consistently asserted the right of free passage
through the Straits to all. A main objective of the Anglo-Dutch struggle was the
acquisition of a strategic place in the Straits (Cowen, 1961). Although the British policy
claiming freedom of both commerce and navigation favored British ships behind a shield
of "general freedom of navigation", it benefited ships of all nations.
Thus, began the establishment of the British East India Company's three important
Straits Settlements. These settlements included Penang Island leased from the Sultan of
Kedah in 1786, Malacca taken over from the Dutch in 1795, and Singapore founded in
1819 by Sir Stamford Raffies. The historical importance of these three Straits Settlements
lie with the fact that they are situated along the SOM, and thus exhibited control over the
Straits regarding international shipping.
The signing of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 marked a new era in the history of
the Straits. It settled a period of colonial struggles by establishing spheres of influence
between the two powers. It adopted the principles of freedom of trade and navigation for
the nationals of the two states and the natives in the area. In addition, it also urged
cooperation to curb piracy in the Eastern Seas (Shaw, 1973).
The importance of holding the sea passage often made it vital for powers to
capture or occupy strategic points along the SOM like Malacca, Penang, and Singapore.
According to Cowen (1961), "the Malacca Straits area was so important to the overall
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distribution ofBritish trade, the China trading interests [were] so powerful, and [the]
Foreign Office and [the] Admiralty ideas on the subject so precisely formulated, that it was
only necessary for a situation to develop which made foreign intervention even a remote
possibility for action to be taken. "
The British were able to retain their naval supremacy over the SOM until the
Japanese invaded Southeast Asia during the Second World War, gaining control of
Singapore in 1942. The SOM became a Japanese seaway in the so-called "Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere" of Japan until its unconditional capitulation in 1945 (pathmanathan,
1975).
Thus, the historic importance of the SOM as an international waterway is evident.
According to one writer, "It would not be too far from the truth to state that the history of
the SOM is the history of the South East Asian Region and more essentially, the history of
the ebb and tide offoreign, political, economic, and cultural influences" (Pathmanathan,
1975).
With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the dominant trade route from
Europe to the Far East shifted from the "Cape Town / Sunda Straits" route to the "Suez /
Malacca Straits" route. As trade and navigation between Asian countries and Africa, and
between the Far East and the Western World grew, the importance of the SOM became
even more significant.
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Geographical Description
The SOM is a waterway connecting the Andaman Sea, in the Indian Ocean, and
the South China Sea, in the Pacific Ocean. It runs between Sumatra, an Indonesian island
to the west and the Malaysia Peninsular and Thailand to the east as can be seen in Figure
1. The SOM encompasses an area of25,000 square miles. It is approximately 500 nautical
miles in length from abreast Acheh Head, the northwestern extremity of Sumatra Island,
and Ko Phuket, to Kukup Island and the Karimun Island, where the Straits join the
Singapore Strait.
It is a funnel-shaped waterway with extremely contrary physical features. The
northern entrance acts as the mouth and tapers southward with the southern portion as the
spout of the funnel as shown in Figure 2. Its width varies from 8.4 to 300 nautical miles at
its narrowest and widest respectively.
According to geologic categorization, the SOM belongs to the Sunda Shelf, which
was an extensive, low-relief land surface at the beginning of Quaternary time, i.e. about
1.6 million years ago. It appears to have remained undisturbed by crustal movements since
the Late Tertiary Period which is about seven million years ago. The SOM attained its
present configuration after having been inundated by the postglacial rise ofsea level
resulting from the melting of ice in lands at higher latitudes.
The importance of the SOM in world communications exists because it lies
between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Basically, it lies between the south-
western part and the south-eastern part of the South China Sea and Andaman Seas.
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FIGURE 1.
SMALL SCALE MAP SHOWING STRAITS OF MALACCA
Source: The Ships Atlas (1989) .
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It is a sea-link between latitudes 6°N and 1°N from the Indian Ocean to the Singapore
Strait and the South China Sea (Britannica, 1961).
In terms of navigation, the SOM is rather shallow at different places. It is up to 24
fathoms deep westward of the Amah Islands, but only between three to seven fathoms
deep southward of these islands. Within about 13 nautical miles of the Amah Islands, the
fairway has depths of 16 to 20 fathoms. Near the Amah Island and the southern end of
North Sands, there is a place called "One Fathom Bank". To the South, there is a
dangerous 3.75 fathoms patch with a navigable channel width at this point of about four
nautical miles.
The SOM varies from 9.5 fathoms to over 30 fathoms between Medang Islands
and Cape Rachado. However, it has a dangerous shallow patch of2.5 fathoms ofwater
near the middle. Between Tanjong Tohor, on the Malaysian coast, and Tanjong Parit, the
northern extreme ofBengkalis Island, the depth varies from 13 to 26 fathoms. Near the
middle of the channel is Long Bank, which is only three fathoms deep. There are similar
banks, some even shallower, between Long Bank and the islands close to Sumatra.
The SOM includes a tremendous sea area from its northwestern most entrance,
between Perak Island and Diamond Point, to its southeastern most entrance, between
Mount Datok and Pergam Coast. There are at least three Strait groups in this zone
traditionally used for navigation by the coastal states. Accordingly, the "Straits of
Malacca" are a collective term for many Straits or Strait groups, among which the
Singapore Strait holds the key to the whole Straits area. However, this study takes
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exception to the term "Straits ofMalacca." For the purpose of this study, it only refers to
the Straits ofMalacca per se because it does not include Singapore Strait .
Weather
The SOM is within the limits of the Northeast and Southwest Monsoons of the
Indian Ocean . Winds are variable because of the high land on both sides, however, land
and sea breezes are regular on both coasts. In the offing, the monsoons are only regular
when they are at their height in the adjacent sea area. Even then the wind is moderate in
the Straits and only lasts for part of the day. The monsoons become more regular towards
the southern part of the Straits.
Between Acheh Head and Ko Phuket, the Southwest Monsoon commences in the
later part of April or the early part ofMay. It ceases in October, but calms and variable
winds frequently prevail in November. The Southwest Monsoon seldom blows far into the
SOM. During this season, variable winds, chiefly from the south-east and south-west,
prevail in the middle of the Straits with periods of long calms. On the Sumatra side, light
winds and calms prevail, and heavy squalls from the land are experienced during the night.
Fewer calms are experienced on the Malaysian side and there are seldom any squalls.
Variable land and sea breezes are usually experienced. During the Southwest Monsoon,
the weather is generally cloudy and stormy especially when the monsoon is at its peak.
Sumatras, or squalls from the south-west, are more common during the Southwest
Monsoon than during the Northeast Monsoon. They generally occur during the first part
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of the night and are accompanied by sudden severe winds with thunder and lightning. They
are more frequent on the north coast of Sumatra and along the Malaysian coast between
Parcelar Hill and the Karimun Islands. Here they usually blow for six or eight hours at a
time as a strong or moderate gale and their characteristic are that ofan arch squall.
Northwesters are not as frequent as the Sumatras. They are most common during
the Southwest Monsoon and occur in the north-west part of the Straits but sometimes are
felt as far south-east as the Singapore Strait . Severe high winds blow at the beginning of
the storm, but their strength soon abates. Generally they are preceded by a black cloud
arch, which rises rapidly from the horizon toward the zenith and are usually accompanied
by thunder, lightning, and heavy rain.
In the SOM, the Northeast Monsoon prevails in the west entrance from November
to April. It is a period of fair season with more settled weather at this time. There are
seldom any severe squalls, and there is less thunder, lightning, and much less rain than in
the other seasons.
In November the winds are variable, frequently from the north-west and west
(extending as far west as Sri Lanka), although occasionally, the north-east winds set in
November. From November to March, the Northeast Monsoon is the strongest. However,
at times north-west and west winds of one or two days duration have been experienced in
every month when the Northeast Monsoon prevails . Late in March, the north-east and
north winds become light and variable, with strong land breezes at night. On the Malaysian
side, these breezes commence between 8 and 10 p.m. and last from four to five hours.
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Sometime it blows all night particularly between Mount Formosa and Cape Rachado.
Less calm exists on the Malaysian side than on the Indonesian side of the Straits.
Tidal Currents
The SOM is relatively shallow, most parts ofthe Straits are less than 40 fathoms,
and thus main water movements are from tidal influences. Throughout the year in SOM,
there is a residual, predominant north-west current.
During the Northeast Monsoon, part of the south-going current in the South
China Sea rounds the southern extremity of the Malay Peninsula and sets north-west
through the SOM. During the period of the Southwest Monsoon, part of the current that
flows through Karimata Strait and into the South China Sea, branches off to the north-
west into the SOM. This north-west current is also present during the transition months
of April and October although at these times it becomes weaker and far less constant.
As the north winter progresses, the Northeast Monsoon becomes well established.
There is some evidence that in winter months, there is an anti-clockwise circulation in the
northern part of the Straits, north oflatitude 3°N. This circulation weakens during the
April transition, and as the Southwest Monsoon becomes established, a clockwise
circulation probably results over the same during the period June to October with a
maximum effect in August.
Though the predominant direction of currents in the Straits is north-west, there are
reports of currents from all directions . The percentage of the frequency of the
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predominant flow is never high. The current is most constant during the period January to
April and is least constant from May to August. By far, the greater number of
observations reported rates of less than one knot. However, some are more than one
knot and so far no currents have been reported in excess of two knots.
Navigation Problems
For seafarers, navigating in narrow channel has always been a challenge, especially
so for large ships in congested areas. As for the SOM, the challenges facing the seafarers
while navigating are mainly with respect to avoiding collision and grounding. The danger
of collision among ships arises due to the increases in the amount of traffic movements
and sizes of ships, which hamper their handling characteristics, specifically with reference
to large tankers. A contributory factor to the dangers of collision arise from increased use
of the Straits for transits, cross channel movements, and fishing, along with the speed of
the ships. This problem is more acute in the case of Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs).
In such cases, decisions for critical navigation, such as stopping, requires approximately
twenty minutes in advance at speeds of 16 knots (Mostert, 1975) . Moreover, the lack of
directional stability of such ships necessitates a constant use of the rudder to maintain
course, and gives rise to unpredictable lateral movements in the event of a "crash stop"
(Moberg, 1976) . Reducing speed in shallow waters effects the ability to decelerate
accordingly. Characteristics ofVLCCs, such as flat bottoms, and single propellers and
rudders, increases the probability ofcollisions. Limitations of maneuverability are
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heightened in the SOM because ofa need to plot a course that takes precise account of
the depth of waters governed by the influence ofchanging tides. Indeed in certain critical
areas deep-draft vessels cannot alter course ''without the danger of running aground"
(Hydrographer Of The Navy, 1971).
The next major problem of navigation is grounding, which arises from the size,
draft, and handling characteristics of ships whose displacement ofwater decreases with
increases in speed that make the precise measurement of under-keel clearance critical. Not
only are there areas of relatively shallow seas and shoals, but the pattern of tides also
change the water level. The relatively shallow waters ofthe SOM have governing depths
of less than twenty-three meters. The greater part of the funnel area are made even more
uncertain by the dune like character of the seabed, whose topography is influenced by
ocean currents. The Admiralty Pilot (1971) also warns that "The attention of deep-draught
vessels passing through SOM is drawn to the possible changes of depth due to the
sandwave formation of the sea-bed ." The desirability of adequate under-keel clearance for
deep-draft ships has been pointed out by the conclusions of four detailed hydrographic
surveys. These surveys, carried out under Japanese patronage, found about one hundred
areas of shallow water of less than twenty-three meters. Because of this, the recommended
maximum speed for VLCCs in critical areas of the SOM as provided in the coastal states
agreement on safety of navigation is twelve knots. This is recommended in the interest of
avoiding undue congestion of traffic.
The problem ofgrounding is also affected by differences in tidal range . It vanes
from 3.8 meters at the entrance and One Fathom Bank to 1.4 meters at the eastern outlet
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of the Singapore Strait. The significance of the former figure is the fact that the coastal
states agreed in February 1977, to set a limit of3.5 meters of under-keel clearance for
deep-draft vessels. With respect to shoal areas around One Fathom Bank and Cape
Rachado, the Admiralty Pilot (1971) warns, "Since deep-draft vessels cannot avoid
passing over certain shoal areas, an accurate prediction of the tide in these areas is
essential" (Hydrographer Of The Navy, 1971). The "Malacca/Singapore Straits Guide to
Planned Passages for Deep Draught Vessels" also highlights the need for precise and
accurate prediction of the tide (ICSOCIMF, 1981).
It is possible to account for surface tidal changes despite constraints imposed on
navigation with attendant consequences for collision. However, the impact of tidal
currents on the bottom of the SaM is much less predictable. For example, it is explained
that, "On the bottom of the Strait[s], strong tidal currents occur, causing large uniform
sand ripples to form. The height of these ripples or sand waves, which form at right angles
to the current, is between 4 to 7 meters and their wave length about 250 meters to 450
meters" (Hydrographer Of The Navy, 1971).
The problem oftransit become more obvious with the enormous carrying capacity
of tankers transiting the SaM. Precision navigation allows for only a minute margin of
error before potentially causing a major ecological disaster. It had been pointed out over a
decade ago that "such aids allow for a fair degree of accuracy in navigation when
conditions are normal, and although this area is free of fog, heavy rain squalls are
encountered, and the degree of accuracy in navigation suffers accordingly" (!MCO, 1966).
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Despite improvements to visual navigational aids, the basic and fundamental problems
involved in transiting the SOM remain. This centers on certain controlling areas
determined by the depths of water that govern the scope ofmaritime passage. A great
variety of ships utilize the SOM, but the most acute problem of passage, in terms of the
worst possible case, arises from its use by deep-draft tankers. Any analysis of transit must
consider tankers, given the density of marine traffic, the strength of tidal streams and
ocean currents, and the numerous shoals capable of tearing through the hull of the ship.
In addition, there is the factor of unpredictable weather. During heavy rain squalls,
visibility may drop sharply to a few hundred meters. The significance of climatic
conditions does not arise from seasonal variations, eventhough the area does fall within
the range of the tropical monsoon. One of the outstanding features of the climate of the
region is its monotony and the daily changes are more pronounced than the seasonal
variations (Hydrographer Of The Navy, 1971). It is the unpredictability of these daily
changes that are a hazard, particularly to deep-draft vessels.
Traffic Movement
Traffic movements in the SOM have been increasing every year, to the extent that
it is referred to as being the busiest or heavily traveled waterway in the world (Naidu,
1994). However, no solid substantial evidence can support this claim. There are wide
variations in the daily estimates of the number of ships transiting the SOM. Estimates of
the traffic volume range between 150 to 500 ships each day. Even taking an average of
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these two extremes, it would mean that the traffic volume in the SOM has increased to the
point that it is now becoming really congested.
Nevertheless, though there are varying estimates of the volume of traffic, the rapid
growth of traffic in the SOM cannot be disputed. The number of ships using the SOM has
more than doubled between 1982 and 1993. It has risen from 44,000 to nearly 100,000,
with the largest increase occurring in 1986. During that period, the annual average rate of
increase was 7.8 percent. By any standard, this is a very high rate ofgrowth. On a daily
basis, 274 ships used the SOM in 1993, up from a daily traffic volume of 119 in 1982
(Naidu, 1994).
The issue at this juncture is whether the traffic volume is generated by the
Malaysian economy. Tentative efforts have been made at estimating the number of ships
using the SOM that also call at the Straits ports of Malaysia . It would appear that only a
small and possibly a declining proportion of the ships passing through the SOM call at
Malaysian ports. Consequently, as much as 90 percent of the SOM shipping traffic is
transit traffic. Furthermore, Malaysia does not have a sizable national fleet, thus, transit
traffic must be principally foreign-flag ships.
The composition of traffic in the SOM is shown in Table 1. It can be seen that
tankers compose a major category of ships from the littoral states' point ofview. It is an
important category of traffic, accounting for a one-third share of the total traffic in the
Straits. Containerships constitute just over 16 percent of the total traffic volume . The
number ofcontainerships traversing the Straits has grown rapidly, no doubt reflecting the
growth of the manufacturing and industrial sectors of the East Asian economies, and
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TABLE 1
NUMBER OF SHIPS BY PERCENTAGE PASSING OFF ONE FATHOM BANK
IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA
TYPE iii 19~7 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Ii' Illl ~ II !I . n
Tanker 35.5 40.0 37.3 35.6 35.3 34.3 32.9
Container 8.2 10.3 14.5 14.2 15.3 16.4 16.4
Tug 3.9 4.4 4.0 4.1 4.8 4.2 4.1
Fishing 5.0 6.9 5.8 5.6 4.2 4.5 4.5
Ro-Ro 1.7 1.8 2.5 2.3 2.8 3.4 3.8
Passenger 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.8
Naval Craft 1.2 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.0
Cargo Carriers 43.6 36.8 34.3 36.3 35.1 35.1 36.1
Others 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
Source: Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
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the changing structure of their external trade. Other types ofcargo carriers constitute
more than a third of the traffic volume.
The increased consumption of oil attendant upon industrial development in all
nations has placed an increasing strain on the delicate balance of interests that has
prevailed in the Straits. As an example, Japan imports nearly all of its oil from the Gulf
States of the Middle East, and virtually all of this oil passes through the SOM in large
tankers. As the volume of crude oil trade increased, the size of the vessels used to
transport it has escalated in quantum jumps. The largest tanker in 1954 was only 47,130
deadweight tons (dwt), whereas by 1975 it had increased to 484,337 dwt . Tankers in
excess of200,000 dwt are increasingly being used regularly in the international
transportation of oil. A significant number of these tankers currently use the SOM.
However, some of the tankers because of their size and the navigational hazards of the
SOM, take an alternative route through the Makassar and Lombok Straits.
Since the SOM forms the shortest channel connecting the Indian and Pacific
Oceans, a great number of vessels transit the SOM without stopping at any ports along the
way . Among these are tankers that ply between the Gulf States of the Middle East and Far
Eastern countries (including the Pacific-Rim Region), especially Japan. From an
environmental point of view, tankers are the most risky . This is because of the magnitude
of the environmental consequences that would occur if one of them were to run aground,
be involved in a collision, or otherwise spill a large amount of oil into the Straits. In
addition, pollution may occur due to oil discharge resulting from ongoing operations such
as ballasting and tank cleaning.
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Traffic Separation Schemes
Traffic Separation Schemes (TSSs) are one of the elements ofa Vessel Traffic
System (VTS). Essentially, a TSS separates traffic in either time or space. Time separation
is actually one-way traffic either continually or alternately. This is common when the
navigable channel is too narrow for two-way traffic. Space separation is more common
and involves nothing more than "drive right"; keep to specified lanes, join at the smallest
possible angle, cross at the greatest angle. In either case, the rule is to conform or to stand
clear and the TSS should violate established traffic patterns as little as possible.
The principle of separation or segregation of traffic traveling in different directions
has been accepted at sea for many years . Indeed, some form of routing on the North
Atlantic has been in operation for almost a century. In the last decade, there has been a
considerable increase in the number and importance of marine traffic schemes . Most of
them exist in fairly restricted waterways, generally approaches to harbors or in straits such
as the Dover Strait. Traffic separation and routing schemes are taken for granted in all
other transport systems. They are essential for safety, but also are recognized as
contributing to efficiency. Against this background, it is surprising that there should still be
such different attitudes towards the regulation of marine traffic, particularly regarding the
extent of adoption and the manner introduced. The principle has long been accepted, since
everyone recognizes that some degree of traffic segregation is essential in some
circumstances.
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Among all the elements making up a VTS, TSSs are the ones most often found in
international waters. An internationally agreed upon TSSs will have up-bound and down-
bound traffic lanes, a separation zone where possible, and coastal or inshore zones for
fishing and local traffic. There may be precautionary areas and areas to avoid.
Precautionary areas are marked offwhen normal traffic patterns are too confused and
confusing to be rationalized.
A TSS should be as well lighted, buoyed, and marked as best as is possible under
the circumstances. Ships need to know when they are entering a traffic lane and when they
are leaving it. Turns need to be marked, as well as all hazards to navigation in or near the
lanes. It is noted that gated buoys, which are basically buoys in pairs across from each
other, are more effective than staggered buoyage, because ships tend toward the buoys.
Some international systems may not be buoyed at all. In any case, TSS areas are best
delimited by prominent geographical features, clearly visible both on the radar and by eye.
Basically what we are looking here is the marine equivalent of those white lines
that separate the road traffic, and related traffic control measures. They are not as useful
and effective unless they are supported by other means . Thus, TSSs are networks of one-
way traffic lanes and separation zones designed basically to physically separate vessels
proceeding in opposite or nearly opposite directions. They provide a necessary point
oriented, local foundation for the further development of almost any traffic system.
Considered a popular means of traffic control, they are quite common and found
worldwide, but they are only a passive tool. Other available passive measures include
maximum and/or minimum speed limits, required speeds, limitations on ship size,
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geographic and/or temporal restrictions on all or some ships, and cargo regulations. As for
areas with very heavy traffic, these passive measures are seldom enough, either alone or in
combination, to completely prevent mishaps.
23
CHAPTER TWO
LEGAL STATUS OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA
Introduction
The strandings of the Torrey Canyon, the Argo Merchant, and the Amoco Cadiz
have resulted in the formulation of various new international regulations (Couper, 1990).
The impact of the Torrey Canyon loss, in 1967, was probably greater than that of the
Titanic. Within two weeks, the then Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization met in emergency session . That session adopted a comprehensive plan to
obtain international agreements on routing of ships, navigational aids, ship construction,
training and certification of seafarers, watch keeping standards, intervention on the high
seas in the event of threat of pollution from a ship, liability of shipowners for pollution
damage, and compensation for oil pollution damage (Couper, 1990).
The Torrey Canyon has prompted half a dozen International Maritime
Organization (IMO) conferences and conventions between 1969 and 1974. Most of them
are mainly with regard to oil pollution, such as the International Convention for the
Prevention ofPollution from Ships (MARPOL 1973). This stranding has also inspired the
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International Convention on the Safety ofLife at Sea (SaLAS 1974), which came into
force in 1980.
Similarly, the stranding of the Argo Merchant was one of a number of tanker
accidents around the United States of America between 1976-77. This accident inspired
President Carter to make a request for further international action. This resulted in two
Protocols that strengthened MARPOL 1973 and SaLAS 1974.
President Carter's initiative, together with the stranding of the Amoco Cadiz in
March 1978, gave urgency to another international conference. This conference mainly
discussed the element of human error in accidents, and resulted in the 1978 International
Convention on Standards ofTraining, Certification and Watch keeping of Seafarers that
entered into force in 1984.
The purpose of this chapter is to make specific recommendations to enhance the
safety ofnavigation in the SaM. First it will highlight the prevailing safety issues before
making specific recommendations within the context ofUNCLOS Ill.
Straits ofMalacca
In 1976, the casualty ofDiego Silang. in the SaM, received widespread media
attention. It accelerated action to improve the safety ofnavigation in the SaM. This lead
to the adoption ofIMO Resolution A 375 (X) i.e. "Navigation through the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore." Basically this resolution describes a new routing system for the
Straits ofMalacca and Singapore, including traffic separation schemes, deep water routes,
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and special rules for deep-draft vessels and Very Large Deep-draft Ships (VLDS). Further
amendments were considered, and in November 1981, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) adopted Resolution A 476 (Xll) on "Navigation Through the Straits
ofMalacca and Singapore." This resolution adopted the amendment to the special rule on
deep-draught vessels, i.e. effectively amending the rules which had been adopted by
resolution A.375(X). The resolution also noted that the Maritime Safety Committee
(MSC), at its forty-third session, had adopted amendments to the TSS and deep-water
routes in the routing system which had been adopted by resolution A.375(X).
The increase in shipping casualties in the SOM have been given further emphasis
by three serious accidents within three months towards the end of 1992. Those accidents
are Royal Pacific / Teju 51, Nagasaki Spirit / Ocean Blessing, and Maersk Navigator /
Sanko Honour, two of which involved loaded tankers and one cruise ship, resulting in
major oil spills and numerous loss of life (Reuters, 1993) . These accidents have caused the
littoral states ofMalaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore to voice a need for improved safety
controls on navigation in the SOM. The eighteenth meeting of the Tripartite Technical
Expert Group (TTEG) on The Safety ofNavigation in the Straits ofMalacca and
Singapore discussed this issue.
Since the early seventies, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have been holding
consultations on safety of navigation through the Straits ofMalacca and Singapore.
Technical officials from the three countries meet periodically in the TTEG meetings.
Discussions are broadly aimed at exchanging information and seeking means to enhance
safety of navigation in the Straits. Matters discussed include among others routing of
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ships, aids to navigation, hydrographic surveys, production ofup-to-date navigational and
tidal charts, verification ofwrecks and shoals, and their removal or marking as necessary.
The TTEG was formed in June 1973. It is charged with engaging in further studies
with a view to formulating a traffic separation scheme . It has to take into account a safety
margin compatible with the interests of the coastal states, to ensure the safety of the
coastal states as well as the interests of the users of the Straits. The TTEG does not have
a fixed schedule of meetings, but meets as and when necessary, with the three countries
taking turns in hosting the meetings. A significant achievement of the Group was the
drawing up of routing measures for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The measures
were jointly advanced to IMO by the three countries, and following their adoption, were
brought into force on May 1, 1981. Besides the routing measures, the three countries have
also, through the TTEG, undertaken a hydrographic survey of the Straits and produced
common datum charts.
Users of the SOM for navigation are categorized as those ships that do and do not
contribute to the national economy or security. The later category are those ships that
merely pass through the Straits exercising the right of transit passage and treating the
SOM as a strait used for international navigation. According to Article 39 ofUNCLOS
ill, in exercising their right of transit passage that is not to be impeded, they have the
following responsibilities:
i) to comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and
practices for safety at sea, including the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea;
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ii) to comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and
practices for the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution from ships;
iii) to refrain from any activity other than those incident to their normal modes of
continuous and expeditious transit; and
iv) to proceed without delay through the Strait.
Coastal State Regulations
What is more alarming is not just the increase in the number ofmarine casualties,
but also the severity of the incidents as to loss oflives, property, and damage to the marine
environment. Article 94 ofUNCLOS III clearly defines the jurisdiction, control, and
responsibility of the Flag State to ensure safety at sea. The fact that the IMO needs to
develop a global program ofPort State Control and to establish a Flag State
Implementation Sub-Committee to ensure that Flag State compliance and implementation
reflects the need to monitor Flag State responsibilities and to eliminate substandard ships.
In the interest of littoral states, it is necessary to take initiatives to regulate
transiting vessels to ensure safety at sea, protection of the environment, and also to ensure
the safety ofother users of the Straits. This specifically benefits those that contribute to
the national economy by having clear and unhindered passage. UNCLOS III has provided
the necessary international legal umbrella to support a variety of new regulatory measures.
Among them are control of navigation, standards of ship construction and operation, and
also the prevention of pollution.
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Article 41 ofUNCLOS III provides for the designation of sea lanes and
prescription of traffic separation schemes. Whilst Article 42 provides for regulations of
maritime traffic and the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution. However, in
drawing up these regulations, it is essential to refer proposals to the competent
international organization. The purpose is to provide a view to their adoption or by giving
effect to applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes,
and other noxious substances in the Straits. As far as safety of navigation and controlling
discharges from ships including dumping at sea, the competent international organization
being referred is the International Maritime Organization.
International Conventions
As ofMay 5, 1994, IMO has developed a number of instruments, codes and
guidelines, and notable conventions (IMO, 1994) to improve ship safety. They include:
1.* Safety of Life At Sea 1974 (SOLAS 74);
2.* SOLAS Protocol 1978;
3. SOLAS Protocol 1988;
4.* International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972
(COLREG 1972);
5. International Convention for the Prevention ofPollution from Ships 1973
as modified by the Protocol of 1978 [MARPOL (amended) 73/78];
6.* Load Lines 1966 (LL 1966);
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7. Protocol 1988 relating to the International Convention on Load Lines
1966 [LLPROT (HSSC) 1988];
8.* Tonnage Measurement of Ships 1969 (Tonnage 1969)~
9. Intervention on the High Seas in Cases ofPollution Casualties 1969
(Intervention 1969);
10. Protocol relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases ofPollution by
Substances other than oil 1973 (Intervention Protocol 1973);
11. Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety ofFishing Vessels
1977 (SFV 1977);
12. Torrernolinos Protocol of 1993 relating to SFV 1977 (SFV PROT 1993);
13.* Standards ofTraining, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers 1978
(STCW 1978);
14. Suppression ofUnlawful Acts Against the Safety ofMaritime Navigation
(SUA 1988);
15. Salvage 1989 (Salvage 1989);
16. Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 1990
(OPRC 1990);
17. Prevention ofMarine Pollution by Dumping ofWastes and Other Matter
1972 as amended [LDC (amended) 1972];
18.* INMARSAT Convention 76;
19. INMARSAT amendments 89 ~ and
20.* INMARSAT OA 76.
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As of 1995, Malaysia has acceded to only eight of the above conventions as
marked by an asterisk. In order to regulate ships transiting the SOM to acceptable
international standards, the Coastal States have to implement the above conventions. If
Malaysia wants to insist on such a move, then it must be ready to accede to these
conventions.
Port State Control
Even by acceding to these conventions and developing national legislation, it is still
may not sufficiently ensure the safety of ships in the SOM. The results of inspections by
Port States in Europe, Australia, Canada, and elsewhere are alarming. Some of the ships
that carry safety certificates, as required by the convention, have been seriously deficient in
complying with the conditions of issuance. This indicates irresponsible conduct by
shipowners, operators, and even authorities that issue or delegated issue of such
certificates. It also reflects poor control and monitoring by Flag states to an extent that it
has reached an intolerable state. Because of this situation, it is necessary for IMO to
develop and promote a checking system by Port States known as Port State Control
(PSC) on a global basis, with a goal ofeliminating substandard ships. Thus, it is necessary
for Malaysia to implement PSC. In order, to achieve the desired objectives ofPSC toward
enhancing safety in the SOM, it is necessary to develop PSC on a regional basis. Its
purpose should be to ensure that ships transiting through the SOM will sooner or later be
subjected to PSC inspections.
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In order for Malaysia to actively participate in the regional PSC program, it needs
to fulfill certain conditions. Among them, Malaysia needs to have the expertise and
resources to inspect both national and foreign ships for compliance with certain
regulations. These regulations are namely SOLAS 1974, SOLAS Protocol 1978, SOLAS
Protocol 1988, COLREG 1972, MARPOL (amended) 73/78 , LL 1966, LL PROT
(HSSC) 1988, STCW 1978, and ILO Convention No . 147.
Grandfather Clause
One of the major factors identified in ship losses is the age of the ship (Editorial,
1993a). As ship ages, there is a general deterioration in its condition that is ultimately
irreversible. The reason why age is a problem with ship losses is that it allows an
accumulation of stresses to build-up . While a ship may be serviceable for a period of time,
stresses begin to accumulate and take a toll on its structural soundness.
This accumulation of stress problems is particularly significant on large bulk
carriers and tankers, as they are subject to high volumes and rates of loading and
discharging. Even with PSC inspections, serious maritime casualties involving older bulk
carriers, tankers, and passenger ships have revealed the vulnerability of such ships to break
up, sink rapidly when ruptured, or be rapidly engulfed in flames. When new conventions
such as SOLAS and MARPOL developed, they effectively prescribe safety measures for
new ships. Industry pressure resulted in the invoking ofIMO Resolution A500. The
introduction of new rules is only on the basis of a compelling need that include provisions
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to allow the continued operation of existing ships. Existing ships can continue operation
by compromising with additional conditions of refit or refurbishment. The 'Grandfather
Clause' has been under severe criticism, specifically when a maritime disaster involving
older tankers or passenger ships cause intolerable marine pollution or numerous loss of
lives.
Malaysia cannot afford an accident such as the Amoco Cadiz, where steering gear
failure could lead to the grounding of a VLCC on the shores of the SOM. The Braer
disaster released 84,000 tons of crude oil into the sea off the Shetland Coast on January 5,
1993. As a result, the European Parliament has passed a resolution which, among other
things, urges authorities in the community to ban tankers more than 15 years old from
using the ports ofMember States. The Braer was a Liberian flag tanker built in 1975.
Ifa similar move is enforced in the SOM, then the safety ofnavigation will
improve and the risk of pollution will be reduced. The Netherlands conducted a study on
the 'Grandfather Clause' following discussions at the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)
on its desirability. It is desirable to limit the operating age of tankers in Malaysian waters.
However, such a move will limit the age of tankers that are acceptable for registry under
the Malaysian flag. This may have serious repercussions on the Malaysian shipping
industry regarding the domestic transportation ofpetroleum. However, if other countries
reciprocate positively to the action ofthe European Community, then Malaysia will need
to follow with a program developed to replace aging tankers.
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Ship Manning And Management
Marine casualties involving collisions between ships in open sea conditions,
groundings in areas provided with navigational aids, and the use of automatic pilot in areas
of high traffic density raises fears of possible poor watch keeping standards. Explosions of
bulk carriers during loading or discharging operations and capsizing of passenger ships
raise fears of poor seamanship, poor quality of crew training, and lack of experience. Such
incidents worldwide have raised the issue of State Parties to the STCW 1978 Convention
that are not in full compliance to the training and certification criteria, as reflected in that
convention.
It is recognized that 80 percent of the causes of maritime casualties result from the
human element (Editorial, 1993b). PSC inspections can determine, to a certain extent, the
physical deficiencies and non-compliance with conventions. However, inspecting officers
are not in a position to question the authenticity of a certificate of competency issued by
Flag states. Incompetence may usually only be discovered after a lengthy court of inquiry
if at all. Such inquiries can reveal the conduct of the holder after a maritime casualty, for
which damage has occurred.
IMO has received proposals on the need to evaluate and assess maritime training
institutions. In addition, it also needs to assess the condition of examination and
certification by authorities, especially when such functions are delegated. In other words,
IMO must consider establishing an international accreditation system for crew training and
issuance of qualification. Such a move will reduce certain rights of the Flag State,
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however, it is a move in the right direction considering the critical role played by the
human element involving the safety ofnavigation in the SOM.
The issue ofdeterioration in the quality of ship management, especially in the areas
of safety and the environment, has been a topic of intense debate at the IMO . In the
shipping industry, regulating bodies such as classification societies are also subject to
market forces. These societies, which are responsible for condition surveys, have sought
to maintain their market share to remain commercially viable. A wide variance in the
quality of classification societies allows irresponsible owners to avoid safety
responsibilities.
The migration from Traditional Flag States to Flags OfConvenience (FOC) and
secondary registries is a clear indication that shipowners will move to flag states that offer
tax and investment incentives . A worrying aspect of this development is the lure of FOC
states, which offer a less stringent approach to ship inspections. PSC inspections have
shown that many FOC ships have failed to comply with agreed international standards.
Substandard ships are operated mainly because of commercial considerations. Some flag
states and classification societies fail to observe shipping standards due to competitive
economic pressures.
In November 1989, IMO developed guidelines with regard to ship operations
(Associated Press, 1992). It appears that guidelines alone do not spur flag states into
observing proper shipping practices, and the IMO is now developing an International
Safety Management Code (ISM). This code is to be established along the guidelines of
IMO Resolution 647, "Guidelines for Management of Safe Ship Operations and Pollution
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Prevention." To make this code effective, it is proposed that it be incorporated into
SOLAS 1974, by introducing a new Chapter IX - Management for the Safe Operation of
Ships. This move will greatly enhance safety in the SOM as the saying goes "behind every
substandard ship is a substandard operator. "
Collision Avoidance And Ship Routing
Eliminating substandard ships and substandard operators will not completely
eliminate the likelihood of serious accidents involving ships carrying dangerous and
noxious substances, or passengers in the SOM. As shipping is a risky business, it can never
be foolproof and therefore risks have to minimized. In order to face unexpected
eventualities, an efficient state ofpreparedness and response has to be established. This is
particularly so when considering the characteristics of navigation in the SOM that
includes :
i) high through and coastal traffic density;
ii) poor visibility during squalls;
iii) low under-keel clearance for deep-draught vessels;
iv) numerous shoals and banks;
v) crossing traffic with confusing patterns by small craft ;
vi) presence ofnumerous fishing craft; and
vii) numerous wrecks in reported approximate positions.
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All these ingredients combined provide an "excellent" condition for an explosive
situation, and such characteristics give rise to the SOM being considered among the
highest risk area for casualties (Associated Press, 1992). The risk of marine casualty in the
SOM will increase with the developments at the ports along both sides of the Straits and
the Asia-Pacific Rim. This will be due to increasing demand to transport hazardous
substances in line with the industrialization of the Asian countries.
The situation has now reached the stage where traffic has to be regulated and
routed. It is in Malaysia's interest to maintain a clear and unobstructed passage of ships
serving the Malaysian ports. Malaysia also needs to ensure that fishing can be carried out
without interruption from through traffic. The need for more regulation on navigation has
been debated and accepted by UNCLOS III. There should be no objection if coastal states
take initiatives that clearly serve the common interest in the prevention and control of
ship-generated pollution, as long as the national action is within the limits of international
requirements and in line with generally accepted international conventions. The above
initiative impacts the control of ships while navigating through the SOM.
In order to accommodate the interests of port, coastal, aquaculture, and tourist
related development along the SOM, it is preferable to restrict through traffic from plying
near the coastline. This can be achieved by introducing an inshore traffic zone to service
the needs of coastal shipping. The introduction of inshore traffic zones is not uncommon,
and have been initiated in other areas such as the Caribbean Sea.
Since the establishment ofTSS in the SOM in 1981, there are no incidents of
shipping casualties within the scheme. But there have been numerous accidents in areas
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outside the scheme. In order to enhance the safety of navigation in the SOM, there is a
need to upgrade the existing "Rules for Navigating In The Straits ofMalacea and
Singapore", such as the addition of precautionary areas and maneuvering conditions.
Such rules are not uncommon because special rules have been adopted in other TSSs such
as in the English Channel, Dover Strait, and Gulf of Suez (Hussein, 1990).
The adoption of a TSS, along with related rules of navigation by the IMO,
especially for a sensitive area like the SOM could be difficult. It will be necessary to get
the cooperation and concurrence of the littoral states to scrutinize the intended rules, to
ensure that any implications with respect to impediment of passage can only be applied to
compelling needs as outlined by existing international law. The establishment ofTSSs
through the SOM will certainly be a major shift from traditional practice as Masters will
no longer be free to exercise the option of drawing a course at their whims.
The littoral states are entrusted with the responsibility to ensure ships are able to
position themselves with reasonable ease; that the route is safe from navigational hazards
and unobstructed with ample maneuvering width . This calls for additional navigational
aids, verification of chartered depths, marking and removal ofwrecks, establishment of
monitoring, and communications capability to issue navigational warnings for presence of
rogue ships and to respond to ships in difficulties. Nonetheless, as such measures would
incur extra expenditures, at issue would be, who should bear the costs.
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Mandatory Ship Reporting
Control of traffic may be done through a TSS, a Vessel Traffic Reporting System
(VTRS) and a Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS). The application ofa TSS is
an acceptable international practice provided the scheme is adopted by IMO. The TSS
may be packaged in an overall Vessel Traffic System (VTS) which will require a VTRS .
At the moment, ship reporting is not mandatory. However, the Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC) has, in its deliberations, considered mandatory ship reporting under a
VTS essential to project oncoming danger and to give ample warning to users. The right
of coastal states to require mandatory ship reporting is not conclusive since it may be
construed as obstructing the rights of a transiting vessel for a "clear and unimpeded
passage." However, only limited information needs to be reported to the VTS . Such
information should not seek to restrict the free movement of ships or cargoes, while
providing a substantive and sustainable service to shipping. The information should at least
include among others, ship name, call sign, position, course, speed, difficulty in navigation,
and whether or not there is any restriction in the ability to maneuver.
Because of the sensitive nature of the SOM, it is necessary for coastal states to
have cargo information, especially regarding cargoes that might be harmful to the marine
environment, in order to enhance the state of preparedness in the event ofa casualty .
Article 211 ofUNCLOS ITI does not impose restrictions on reporting systems for coastal
states to establish international rules and standards to prevent, reduce, and control
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pollution provided those actions are done through IMO. However, ongoing debate at
IMO has indicated a number of objections from some member states.
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CHAPTER THREE
ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY OF NAVIGAnON
Introduction
The SOM links the Indian Ocean (Andaman Sea) with the Pacific Ocean (South
China Sea). It is the shortest, most economical route and crossroads for the very busy
ocean traffic between Europe and the Far East, between Australia and Asia, and between
the rich oil fields of the Persian Gulf and Japan. The international world of shipping
realizes that the SOM is one of the most densely traversed sea areas in the world, ranking
second only to the English Channel.
The past few years have witnessed the formation of regional economic groupings
around the world, including the thriving economies and infrastructure transformation of
the Asia-Pacific Region. In the 1990s, the Asia-Pacific countries have enjoyed
considerable economic success, which results in an increase in trade that demands more
shipping movements.
The number of ships passing through the SOM has been increasing, doubling since
1982. Increases in demand for shipping movements in the Asia-Pacific countries has
resulted in a rapid increase in the number of ships passing through the SOM. An increase
in the number of marine casualties in the SOM, resulting from increased traffic
movements, has raised serious concerns for the Malaysian Government.
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According to Ouchi (1994), Japan's annual import ofcrude oil for 1993 was 250
million tons, with about 80 percent of these imports moving through the SaM. Assuming
the average tanker size used to transport the crude oil was 150,000 deadweight tons,
there were 1,333.33 trips made that year to ship this total quantity to Japan. On a daily
basis, an average of3.65 shipments carrying approximately 547,945 tons of crude oil
passed through the SaM in 1993 just to meet Japan's crude oil import needs. Thus, in
1993 alone, based on the above assumption, it would require a daily shipment of3.65.
The vulnerability of the traffic is not necessarily due to the number or size of
tankers and bulk carriers, but is related to the overall number of ships of all kinds that
traverse the very limited navigable sea lane of the SaM. High traffic movements and the
large quantities of crude oil moving through the SaM could contribute to potential major
catastrophe. Should such a catastrophe happened, the implications and losses to Malaysia
will be very great, especially in terms of foreign exchange earnings for the country
attributable to the tourism industry.
Although tourism is a newly emerging industry in Malaysia, it is already an
important economic activity. Tourism is now being vigorously promoted by the Malaysian
Government because of its strong multiplier effects. It is a major source offoreign
exchange earnings for the country, and it also generates a lot ofemployment. For the
foreseeable future, such tourism would continue to be largely based on natural resources
such as the country's beaches.
The tourist spots along the SaM are in fact a vital segment ofMalaysia's tourism
industry. Along the SaM are some of the best established and largest tourism spots in
Malaysia. They include a number of the country's best known tourist havens such as
Penang Island, Langkawi Island, Pangkor Island, Port Dickson, and Pulau Besar. These
major tourist resorts generate millions of dollars in terms of foreign exchange. The tourist
industry is in fact the third largest sector in terms ofMalaysia's foreign exchange earnings.
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Earnings from tourism will be drastically reduced should a major oil pollution incident
happen close to these resorts. Therefore, the future of the tourism industry in Malaysia is
very dependent upon a clean and unpolluted SOM. In fact, the Malaysian Government is
cognizant of the need to give special emphasis to the state of the environment within the
SOM in order to protect its tourism potential.
The offshore region of the coastal zone of the SOM, besides being an important
international waterway and fishing ground, consists of many islands, coral reefs, estuaries,
deltas, lagoons, and barrier islands. A total of 241 islands are found in the SOM. The
coastal areas fronting the SOM are very delicate and are in potential grave danger ofbeing
affected by oil pollution.
The problems associated with navigation in the SOM caught the attention of the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), later known as
International Maritime Organization (IMO), as early as 1960s. The introduction of a
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) in the Dover Straits, which came into operation on June
1, 1967, has acted as a catalyst for the establishment of a TSS in the SOM. With a
precedent established in the Dover Straits, discussions at IMCO have been directed
towards the establishment of a TSS in SOM beginning in December 1967, at the Fourth
Session ofits Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation.
An increasing number ofmarine casualties resulting in major oil spills in 1970s,
such as those involving the Showa Maru and the Diego Silang, caused Malaysia and
Indonesia to reiterate to IMCO on the urgent need of establishing a TSS in the SOM. The
TSS was approved by IMCO on November 14, 1977, after evaluating two proposals on
an interim TSS proposed by the International Chamber of Shipping and the American
Institute ofMerchant Shipping, followed by a series of deliberation and consideration.
Finally, with the intention of reducing the number of marine casualties in the SOM, a
TSS was implemented on May 1, 1981.
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Except for the implementation of the TSS in 1981, no major development has
taken place to enhance the safety ofnavigation within the SOM. Looking at the potential
risks and their catastrophic potential, unless major improvements to cater the need of the
increased traffic are undertaken, accidents resulting in major catastrophes cannot be ruled
out.
Traffic Movement and Marine Casualty Data
The shipping industry not only lags behind other industries in development, it is
also deficient in the area of data collection such as marine casualties statistics. In his paper,
Dobler (1994) indicates the need for publication ofdetailed global marine casualty
statistics. However, he also notes that there is no coordinated effort to compile such
statistics, and if a need arises to use the data, one has to rely on partial statistical
information that is regularly published by private sources.
Gathering ofdata for this study was extremely difficult, as no single known source
was available to provide such information. There is no one establishment that monitors
and keeps records on traffic movements and marine casualties data for the SOM. The
collection ofdata used in this study was acquired in bits and pieces. For this study, data on
the traffic movements for the SOM, shown in Table 2, were derived by making some
adjustments to the Annual Reports of the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA). The
statistics presented by PSA are not the figures for traffic movements in the SOM per se,
but the figures for the annual ship arrivals at the Port of Singapore.
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TABLE 2
TRAFFIC MOVEMENTS AND MARINE CASUALTIES IN THE STRAITS OF
MALACCA FROM 1982-1993
Year Total Tnlffic ~!aysianGenerated 1iumberof
Mov ent Traffic Casualties
~
'II! ~
1982 43,633 6,916 7
1983 43,748 7,321 0
1984 41,982 7,731 2
1985 43,837 7,971 4
1986 48,866 7,527 4
1987 51,072 7,468 3
1988 53,826 7,427 1
1989 58,924 8,259 1
1990 72,416 8,785 8
1991 84,414 9,371 4
1992 91,826 10,268 8
1993 99,888 10,540 4
Sources: Naidu, 1994.
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Adjustments that were made to the Annual Reports are as explained as follows.
Ships arrival statistics as shown in PSA are adjusted upward by 20 percent to derive the
traffic movements for the SOM (Naidu, 1994). The 20 percent adjustment was necessary
to accommodate the following situations:
a) the need to subtract from PSA's ship arrivals statistics, those ships, namely
Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), that call at Singapore but do not make use of
the SOM, i.e. those VLCC using the Lombok Straits.
b) the need to include through traffic in the SOM in both directions, that does not
call at Singapore, and thus is not accounted for in the PSA statistics.
c) the need to account for feeder traffic between Peninsular Malaysia and
Singapore, which is only accounted for once in the statistics of the PSA, but
actually involves two directional traffic in the SOM.
For the purpose of this study, marine casualties comprise collisions, groundings,
and others, as defined below:
i) Collision is the act ofcolliding or a violent striking together between two or more ships.
It often happens in busy inland water, sea lanes, or straits. Collisions are usually the result
ofhuman error. A collision is counted as one incident, regardless whether there are two or
more ships involved. However, for the purpose ofcounting the number ofships involved
in the marine casualty, an actual count of the number of ships involved is used . As an
example, if it is a two ship collision, it is counted as twice.
ii) Grounding is the act of driving or running ship aground. Usually it happens in coastal
areas ofhigh traffic density, often the result of mechanical failure, bad weather, or
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navigational error. Large ships are prone to grounding in vicinity of restricted channels,
where there is little room to maneuver.
iii) Others include all other incidents besides collision and grounding, among them are
touching bottom, fire, explosion, beaching, foundering, and missing at sea.
Data compilation for the SOM on marine casualties were basically non-existent in
the 1960s and are more readily available after mid-1970s. The Malaysia Department of
Environment (MDOE), started compiling marine casualty data in 1976, followed by the
Malaysian Federal Marine Department (MFMD), and Lloyd's Maritime Information
Services (LMIS) in 1979. It is suspected that not all incidents of marine casualties in the
SOM were reported and fully documented in the 1960s and 1970s.
Most of the marine casualty data for the SOM in the 1980s are well documented
by LMIS. Except for those incidents resulting in minor or negligible damages, all incidents
are reported by LMIS. It is then safe to assume that the compilation of marine casualty
data has intensified in the later years as compared to the earlier years.
The Marine casualty statistics used for this study are a compilation of data from
LMIS, MDOE, and MFMD. The data are for ships of greater than 100 gross registered
tons (GRT). However, the data will also include collisions involving ships of less than 100
GRT, when they collide with larger vessel. Although some of the observations did not
contain full information, as they were not reported during the incident, every endeavor
was taken to obtain the necessary missing information. In such cases, Lloyd's Ship
Register was used to obtain some of the missing information. However, some of the
information regarding ships that were involved in casualties were not reported in Lloyd's
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Ship Register, and in such cases the variable with missing data was considered as a no data
category. In addition, "perpetual calendar" is used to determine the day when the
casualties happened based on the available dates. A perpetual calendar is a calendar that
enables one to determine the day of the week for any given date.
Due to the availability of data, this study covers a period from January 1, 1968
until December 31, 1994. The TSS in the SOM was implemented on May 1, 1981. Since
one of the objectives of this study was to gauge the effectiveness ofthe TSS, then it was
only natural to divide the study period into two sub-periods, i.e. Pre-TSS and Post-TSS.
The Pre-TSS period covered from January 1, 1968 to April 30, 1981, and the Post-TSS
from May 1, 1981 to December 31, 1994.
Hypotheses
As far as accidents are concerned, regardless whether they occur on land, in the
air, or at sea, the perception is that an increase in traffic movements will result in an
increase in the number ofaccidents. Most of these claims made with respect to the SOM
have never supported by any study. This study encompasses two broad areas namely legal
status and navigational safety . It poses two hypotheses regarding navigational safety . The
first hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between traffic movements and the
number of marine casualties, thus an increase in traffic movements will result in an
increased risk in marine casualties. The second hypothesis is that the TSS does not have
any effect on the trend of the marine casualties that happened in the SOM. Therefore,
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there were no significant changes in the trend of the marine casualties before and after the
implementation of the TSS in the SOM on May 1, 1981.
Methodology
In view ofthe expected growth of marine traffic movements and the increase in the
transportation of petroleum products over the past two decades, considerable attempts
have been made towards the development of maritime risk evaluation methods. The main
objective is to quantify the probability of marine casualties. To date, the methods
developed can be divided into two categories namely Kinematics Models and Historical
Data Analysis. Based upon previous marine casualty investigations, 80 percent of the
incidents are due to human error. It is widely accepted that human behavior cannot be
fully described by a mathematical formula . Therefore, Kinematics Models are not
recognized as a suitable method for estimating this probability.
Previous studies on Historical Data Analysis [(National Ports Council, 1976),
(Goodwin, 1977), (Ecker, 1978), (Karlsen, 1980), (Ligthart, 1980), (Coldwell, 1981),
(Groenhuis, 1981), (Read, 1981), and (Tuovinen, 1983)] have estimated the probability of
marine casualties to be the ratio of the number of observed marine casualties to the
number of traffic movements. This study makes use of the Historical Data Analysis. It has
been observed by Kwik (1986), that this method has some shortcomings as listed below:
(a) The probabilities estimated this way are only correct in a probabilistic sense, when the
assumption is satisfied that every ship movement has the same probability of happening.
(b) The occurrence of marine casualty happening in a particular area is very seldom, and if
they do happen, are rarely similar. In this situation, when collecting data one would have
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to look far back into the past to get a statistically meaningful sample for one specific sea
area. By then, the situation and circumstances of traffic may have changed considerably,
so that the index determined would not be readily applicable for specifying the safety of
the present or the future.
(c) The index would not be readily applicable to other sea areas, because the situation may
differ considerably due to different traffic structures, different navigational aids, and
different geomorphologic conditions.
(d) The influence of technical measures on the accident rate is not always clearly given in
statistics, so that it is nearly impossible to find out which measure has been responsible for
which improvement.
(e) Inaccuracies arise from the fact that near misses and unreported minor accidents are
not taken into account at all. Under different circumstances and for less fortunate ships,
such events may well have resulted in casualties.
In spite of all the shortcomings identified above, the Historical Data Analysis is still
suitable for application in the case of SOM for the following reasons:
i) Marine casualties do happen in the SOM, and the data collected for this study dated as
far back as January 1, 1968.
ii) The situation or circumstances have not changed throughout the study period. Except
for the introduction of the TSS in 1981, no major improvement has taken place in the
SOM.
iii) This study is specifically for the SOM, and is not intended for application to other
areas.
The marine casualty data collected date as far back as 1968, whilst the data for
traffic movements only date back to 1982. Since the first hypothesis of this study is to
examine the relationship between traffic movements and marine casualties, the initial year
of this study was 1982 and the terminal year was 1993.
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The first hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between traffic movements
and the number of marine casualties was tested by examining the frequency rate of the
occurrence ofeach casualty. The frequency rate was derived by dividing traffic
movements by the number ofcasualties for each year. In order for the hypothesis to be
accepted, the frequency rate of occurrence should increase or become more frequent. As a
hypothetical example, one casualty in 10,000 traffic movement is more frequent than one
casualty in 12,000 traffic movements. The formula stated below was used to determine the
frequency rate:
F== TM/MC
where: F is the frequency rate of occurrence i.e, number oftraffic movements to
result in one casualty;
TM is the traffic movements i.e. number of ships passing through per year;
MC is the number of marine casualties recorded for the year.
The second hypothesis was tested by analyzing the marine casualty data. For this
hypothesis, the marine casualty data collected for this study were between 1968 to 1994,
the initial and terminal years respectively
The period of this study was from January 1, 1968, until December 31, 1994. In
the SOM, the TSS was implemented on May 1, 1981. Since one ofthe objectives of this
study was to gauge the effectiveness of the TSS, the study period was divided into two
sub-periods, i.e. Pre-TSS and Post-TSS. The Pre-TSS period covered from January 1,
1968, to April 30, 1981, and the Post-TSS from May 1, 1981, to December 31, 1994.
Thus, the duration of the Pre-TSS period was 13 years 4 months and the Post-TSS period
was 13 years 8 months.
Data for this study were the most laborious compilation of marine casualty data
ever compiled for SOM. This study was the first effort in examining the detailed marine
casualties and the effectiveness of the TSS in the SOM.
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The analysis to test the second hypothesis made use of eight variables:
i) Month ofincident; ii) Day of incident; iii) Flag State of ship; iv) Type of ship; v) Size of
ship; vi) Age ofship; vii) Type of casualty; and viii) Location of incident.
For each variable, three analyses were conducted. One analysis was for the entire
sample period, i.e. from January 1, 1968, to December 31, 1994, and the other two
analyses were for each sub-period, i.e. Pre-TSS and Post-TSS. The rationale for analyzing
the entire sample period was to provide a full overview before looking precisely at the
details in each sub-period. The entire sample period analysis was the sum total of what
happened in both the sub-periods, i.e. Pre-TSS and Post-TSS. The results ofboth the sub-
periods analysis were compared to determine trends in marine casualties. The consensus
of the variables will either support or reject the second hypothesis.
Month of Incident
The purpose of the monthly incident analysis was to verify the month with the
most marine casualties. Weather for the month with the highest number of marine
casualties was examined then to ascertain whether marine casualties are linked with
weather conditions such as fog or squalls. Marine casualties are composed ofvarious
incidents such as collisions, groundings, and others. In addition, a monthly analysis for
individual types of incidence were also be conducted. This analysis determined the month
that is more prone to a specific type of incident.
Day of Incident
The purpose of the daily incident analysis was to verify the day of the week with
the most marine casualties. For this analysis, marine casualties were divided into three
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categories namely collisions, groundings, and others. The day of the week with the highest
number of incidents should correlate directly with the behavior or the attitude of the
officer of the watch (OOW) concerning the incident. It is widely claimed that the days
towards the end of the week such as Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays are more prone to
incidence because of the relax attitude of the DOW . This analysis determined the days that
are prone to a specific type of incident.
Flag State of Ship
The purpose of the Flag State analysis was to verify the Flag State that has the
highest number of ships that are involved in marine casualties. Ships ofvarious flags ply
the SOM daily, and it is widely claimed that flag ofconvenience (FOC) ships are more
prone to marine casualties, because of their lower safety requirements. This analysis
identified the percentage ofFOC ships that were involved in marine casualties. In addition,
it confirmed whether there was any basis for the claim that FOC ships have the highest
casualty rates . The results can also verify a need for the introduction ofPort-State Control
(PSC) in the Asia-Pacific region .
Type of Ship
The purpose of the ship type analysis was to verify the type of ship that has the
highest percentage involvement in marine casualties. On daily basis, the types of ships that
ply the SOM are comprised of tankers, general cargoships, containerships, and etc .
Previous records indicated that tankers comprise about 35 percent of the ships that ply the
SOM. This analysis was able to confirm whether the percentage ofthe type of ships that
were involved in marine casualties was proportional to the percentage of the type of ships
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that made-up the traffic volume. In this case, it was expected that tankers represent a
larger percentage of those ships that were involved in marine casualties.
Size of Ship
The purpose of the ship size analysis was to verify the size ofship that had the
highest percentage among the ships that were involved in marine casualties. Ships of
various sizes, ranging from a small fishing vessels to super tankers of up to 200,000 dwt .,
ply the SOM daily. As most of the areas in the SOM are shallow, it was expected that
larger ship sizes will made-up a greater percentage of the ships that were involved in
marine casualties. For this analysis, the sizes of ships were divided by GRT into five
categories namely, less than 500 GRT, 501·5,000 GRT, 5,001-50,000 GRT, 50,001-
100,000 GRT, and greater than 100,000 GRT. For the purpose of this study, ships of
greater than 50,000 GRT were considered as large ships. The rationale of these ship size
categories are to segregate ships by sizes, and trading areas as explained below:
i)less than 500 GRT : to cater for smaller type of ships such as fishing vessels,
tugboats and coastal general cargo ships;
ii) 501-5,000 GRT : to cater for ocean-going general cargo ships, coastal
containership feeders, and coastal refined petroleum product tankers;
iii) 5,001-50,000 GRT: to cater for ocean-going containerships, bulk carriers,
passenger ships, refined petroleum product tankers, and parcel tankers;
iv) 50,000-100,000 GRT: to cater for larger ocean-going ships such as bulk
carriers, containerships and crude oil carriers; and
v) above 100,000: to cater for ocean-going very large bulk carriers such as OBOs
i.e. Oil-Bulk-Ore, and Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs).
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Age of Ship
The purpose of the ship age analysis was to verify the age group of ships that have
the highest percentage among the ships that were involved in marine casualties. The age
groupings of ships were from 1 to 5 years, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 15 years, and greater than
15 years. The age of the ship at the time of incident is the difference between the year of
incident and the year built. It is widely claimed that older ships are more prone to marine
casualties. Furthermore, with the beefing-up of the port-state control in Europe, it was
expected that older ships will be redeployed to the Far-East.
Type of Casualty
The purpose of the casualty type analysis was to verify the type of casualty that
had the highest percentage ofoccurrence. Marine casualties comprise ofvarious types of
incidence such as collisions, groundings, and others. It was expected that in restricted and
shallow water and with heavy traffic movements, most casualties were collisions. The type
of casualty is a good indicator of the actual problems in the SOM, i.e. whether it is due to
the shallowness of the water or the traffic volume. The type of casualty will also determine
the necessary recommendation to improve the situation in the SOM.
Location of Casualty
The purpose of the location analysis was to verify specific areas in which casualties
have happened. For this study, the SOM was divided into areas as per the "Sailing
Directions for the Strait ofMalacca and Sumatera" published by USA Defense Mapping
Agency. Basically, the SOM was divided into 5 areas, namely 1,2,3,4, and 5 as can be
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seen in Figure 3. The areas were divided by geographical location, thus they vary in sizes
and traffic density. The results of the analysis determined the areas that were more prone
to marine casualties. This will provide insights to the effectiveness of the TSS and
navigational aids currently available in the area.
Frequency Rate ofMarine Casualties Analysis
The number of observations for this analysis was twelve years, whereby the initial
year was 1982 and the terminal year was 1993. The frequency rate figure was derived by
dividing the traffic movements by the number of marine casualties for each respective year.
This indicated the number of traffic movements per casualty for that particular year. The
frequency rate was assumed to be inversely proportional to the probability of the
occurrence of marine casualties. An increase in the frequency rate resulted in a decrease in
the probability of marine casualty occurrence.
Table 3 shows the frequency rate of marine casualties for the SOM from 1982 to
1993. The frequency rates fluctuated from a low 6,233 in 1982 to a high of 58,924 in
1989 . Basically there was no frequency rate for 1983 because there were no casualties in
that year. Thus, 1983 was left out in the computation of the mean frequency in this
analysis. But for other purposes, the frequency rate for 1983 was considered to be greater
than 43,748.
The frequency mean was 15,015 and it was derived by dividing the total number of
traffic movements by the total number of marine casualties from 1982 to 1993 but not
56
S·
O·
PULAU~
SlMEULUE~
t ..<1
. ~~ '"
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
S "
O·
5·
INDIAN
OCEAN
95" 100·
FIGURE 3
lOS"
5 "
DIVISION OF AREAS IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA
Source: Hydrographer of Navy.
57
TABLE 3
FREQUENCY RATE OF MARINE CASUALTIES FOR THE STRAITS OF
MALACCA FROM 1982 TO 1993
Year n il Total Traffic IIIJ- ~ Number-of ~ Frequency Rate
Movements
..
Casualties of Marine Casualties
Ill:
*",,11 III "ill ~ ~ Ie.. .• 1-
1982 43,633 7 6,233
1983 43,748 0 -
1984 41,982 2 20,991
1985 43,837 4 10,959
1986 48,866 4 12,216
1987 51,072 3 17,024
1988 53,826 1 53,826
1989 58,924 1 58,924
1990 72,416 8 9,052
1991 84,414 4 21,104
1992 91,826 8 11,478
1993 99,888 4 24,972
Sources: Naidu, 1994.
Author's Calculation.
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considering the 1983 figures. What this really means is that it takes on average of 15,015
ship movements in the SOM for one marine casualty to happen.
Out of the frequencies observed, seven out of twelve years were above the mean
frequency rate. Basically, it took more than 15,015 ship movements for each casualty to
occur in 1983,1984,1987,1988,1989,1991, and 1993. In these years, the probability
of the occurrence of marine casualty was lower than the years whose frequency rates were
lower than the mean frequency rate. Besides the seven years mentioned, all the other years
were below the mean frequency rate. As can be seen from Table 3, the highest frequency
was 53,826 in 1989 and the lowest was 6,233 in 1982. Tbis indicated that the probability
of occurrence of marine casualty was lowest in 1989 and highest in 1982.
The determining factors for the frequency rate were traffic movements and the
number ofmarine casualties. The traffic movements are shown in Table 3, except for 1984
the trend was increasing every year. On the other hand, there seems to be no trend for
marine casualties. It fluctuated from 0 in 1983 to a record high of 8 in 1990 and 1992. The
claim that the traffic movement was increasing over time was valid, but there was no
obvious direct relationship between the number of marine casualties and traffic
movements.
However, based on the mean frequency rate, only five out of twelve observations
were below the mean frequency rate . In this case, only 42 percent ofthe observations had
one casualty in traffic movements ofless than 15,015. Following the probability of the
occurrence of marine casualty assumption, it was concluded that there was no direct
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relationship between traffic movements and the number of marine casualties. Thus, the
analysis allowed for the rejection of first hypothesis.
In comparison with other areas, studies on the Humber Seaway, in the United
Kingdom (Coldwell, 1981), showed a marine casualty for every 5,302 traffic movements.
While in Tokyo Bay, Japan (Fujii, 1978), figures indicated a marine casualty for every
1,820 traffic movements. On the other hand, Wesper (1978) stated that the frequency rate
in open North Sea areas is one collision for every 80,000 traffic movements. After making
necessary adjustments to include grounding incidents, it was estimated that open North
Sea area has a marine casualty in every 64,000 traffic movements (Wesper, 1978).
Based on the results of this study, SOM has a mean frequency rate of 15,015. This
indicated that the SOM has a much higher mean frequency rate compared to the Humber
Seaway, in the United Kingdom, and to Tokyo Bay, in Japan. What this really indicated
was that the probability of marine casualties was much higher in both the Humber Seaway
and Tokyo Bay than in the SOM . However, the open North Sea area was safer than the
SOM with a frequency rate of 64,000 (see Table 4). Despite having the world's busiest
sealane, the North Sea was a safer area when compared to the Humber Seaway, Tokyo
Bay, and the SOM. This was probably due to the existence of extensive TSSs in the North
Sea Area .
It is more appropriate to compare the SOM with North Sea rather than Tokyo Bay
and Humber Seaway. Both Tokyo Bay and Humber Seaway are enclosed areas and are
more like port approaches. The SOM and North Sea are alike with respect to high traffic
movements. However, despite bad weather such as reduced visibility due to fog in the
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TABLE 4
MEAN FREQUENCY RATE OF OTHER AREAS
Tokyo Bay, Japan
Humber Seaway, UK
Straits of Malacea
Open North Sea
1,820
5,302
15,015
64,000
Source: Fujii (1978), Wesper (1978), and Coldwell (1981).
Author's Calculation.
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North Sea, the probability of the occurrence of marine casualty was still lower than the
SOM.
Analysis ofTrends ofMarine Casualty
Results ofMonth of Incident Analysis
For the entire sample period, there were seventy-six incidents of marine casualties
involving one hundred and eighteen ships. The month with the highest incident rate was
November, with eleven cases as shown in Table 5. It was followed by September and
March with nine and eight cases respectively.
The results of the analysis by type of incident, for the entire sample period are as
shown in Table 6, and revealed that September recorded six collisions, the highest
amongst all the months and followed by January with five collisions. There were six
months with three collisions each namely April, May, June, August, October, and
December. As for grounding, the highest was two cases that occurred in February,
September and November.
During the Pre-TSS period, there were a total of twenty-one incidents that
involved thirty-two ships. The month with the most incidents was March with five cases.
Next to March, there were three months with three cases of incidents each namely
January, July, and September. The highest number of collisions occurred in the month of
March and July with three collisions each. They were followed by January, June and
September with two collisions each as seen in Table 7. There were no collisions in
February, May, November, and December. During this period, only one grounding
incident was reported in the months of January, March, and September. For the remaining
months, there were no grounding incidents .
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TABLE 5
RESULTS OF MONTH OF INCIDENT ANALYSIS:
FOR ALL INCIDENTS
Janu 7 3 4
Feb 6 6
March 8 5 3
A ril 4 2 2
Ma 5 5
June 6 2 4
Jul 5 3 2
Au st 6 2 4
Se tember 9 3 6
October 5 1 4
November 11 11
December 4 4
Total 76 21 55
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department of
Environment, and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
63
TABLE 6
RESULTS OF MONTH OF INCIDENT ANALYSIS:
INDIVIDUAL INCIDENTS FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE PERIOD
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January 5 1
- - -
1
February 4 2
- - - -
March 4 1
-
2 - 1
April 3 - - - 1 -
May 3 1 - 1 - -
June 3 1 - - 1 1
July 4 - 1 - - -
August 3 - 2 1 - -
September 6 2 1 - - -
October 3 1
- - - 1
November 5 2 2 - - 2
December 3 - - - 1 -
Total 46 11 6 4 3 6
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
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TABLE 7
RESULTS OF MONTH OF INCIDENT ANALYSIS:
INDIVIDUAL INCIDENTS FOR PRE-TSS PERIOD
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January 2 1 - - - -
February
- - - - - -
March 3 1 - 1 - -
April 1 - - - 1 -
May
- - - - - -
June 2 - - - - -
July 3 - - - - -
August 1 - - 1 - -
September 2 1 - - - -
October 1 - - - - -
November
- - - - - -
December - - - - - -
Total 15 3 - 2 1 -
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
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For the Post-TSS period, there were fifty-five incidents involving eighty-six ships,
and November had the most with eleven cases. It was followed by February and
September with six cases of incidents each. As for collisions, there were five in November,
the highest for the Post-TSS period as seen in Table 8. It was followed by February and
September, with four incidents of collisions each. The lowest number of collisions were
reported in March, June and July, with one collision for each month . The highest number
ofgroundings were in February and November, with two cases each. One grounding
incident was reported for the month ofMay, June, September, and October. In the
remaining months, there were no groundings reported.
Fog is rare in the SOM, however, visibility is reduced due to heavy rainfalls or
squalls. These heavy rainfalls or squalls are known as the Sumatras. They prevail more
frequently during the Southwest Monsoon, than during the Northeast Monsoon. The
Southwest Monsoon commences in May and ceases in October, however, calms and
variable winds frequently prevail in November.
As can be seen, the months with the highest number of collisions for the entire
sample period and the Pre-TSS, were within the period of the Southwest Monsoon. For
the Post-TSS period, the month with the highest number of collisions was November,
which is the beginning period ofNortheast Monsoon. It is basically a transitional period
between the monsoons, and therefore calms and variable winds frequently prevail.
For the entire sample period, there were forty-six cases ofcollisions. Twenty-two
of these occurred during the period of Southwest Monsoon, that is from May to October.
On the other hand, during the Pre-TSS period, there were fifteen cases of collisions, and
nine of the cases occurred during the Southwest Monsoon. After the introduction of the
TSS in the SOM, out ofa total of thirty-one collisions, only thirteen occurred during the
Southwest Monsoon season.
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TABLE 8
RESULTS OF MONTH OF INCIDENT ANALYSIS:
INDIVIDUAL INCIDENTS FORPOST-TSS PERIOD
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r¥·Ii?~":'·- ,;;'i,C;..:/: ,pC~ ' '';:';~:';'''" ::;c~:~', ;:N~ ~'-;"i;'";?,;,;~, ""i"" d" lIJr' 'hiib::;"""""'tl;i!WIoil~~~~_~~-:~~:r:1i:i~I~~~~:: b~¥:~~i~.~~~~J~~~~!:,~~~:.~ J ~:~~r~~~ :~~~ '1i '~0~!~a i~:~~~f~.IP~
January 3 - - - - 1
February 4 2 - - - -
March 1 - - 1 - 1
April 2 - - - - -
May 3 1
-
1
- -
June 1 1 - - 1 1
July 1 - 1 - - -
August 2 - 2 - - -
September 4 1 1 - - -
October 2 1 - - - 1
November 5 2 2 - - 2
December 3 - - - 1 -
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
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The results of the analysis revealed that periods ofheavy rainfall or squalls, that
result in reduced visibility during the Southwest Monsoon, did not cause any significant
increase in the number ofmarine casualties. Based on the results of the analysis, the
months with the highest number of incidents ofcollisions and groundings, were not linked
with months of reduced visibility. However, some of the months with the highest number
of incidents occurred during the Southwest Monsoon season. The trend of the collision
incidents vary from the Pre-TSS and Post-TSS period. During the Pre-TSS period, 60
percent of collisions occurred during the Southwest Monsoon season. However, for the
Post-TSS period, only 42 percent ofcollisions occurred during the Southwest Monsoon.
Regarding the entire sample period, only 48 percent of collisions occurred during the
Southwest Monsoon season. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the Southwest Monsoon
was not a major contributing factor for collisions and other incidents.
The analysis results showed that the trend changes from the Pre-TSS period to Post-TSS
period, and thus, the second hypothesis was rejected .
Results ofDay of Incident Analysis
There were seventy-six incidents ofmarine casualties during the entire sample
period . The results of the analysis as shown in Table 9 revealed that there were thirteen
casualties that happened on Wednesday, which was the highest among all the days of the
week. This was followed by Monday and Friday with eleven casualties each, while the
lowest incident rate was seven for Thursdays. Four of the casualties were under the no
data category since the dates and days of the occurrences were not reported .
During the Pre-TSS period, Friday had five casualties, which was the highest. It
was followed by Wednesday, which had three, while the lowest was one which occurred
on Tuesday. All the four casualties reported under the no data category occurred during
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TABLE 9
RESULTS OF DAY OF INCIDENT ANALYSIS :
FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE PERIOD, PRE-TSS, AND POST-TSS
[2i~~:;'~~:~(~:27::~j:j~~illf:~:~ iZit~i:~i5Z;~iji~;~i:::£i~[~£~~~~~~J
Monday 11 2 9
Tuesday 10 1 9
Wednesday 13 3 10
Thursday 7 2 5
Friday 11 5 6
Saturday 10 2 8
Sunday 10 2 8
No Data 4 4
-
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation .
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this period .
As for the Post-TSS period, Wednesday had ten casualties, which was the highest.
It was closely followed by Monday and Tuesday with nine each. The day with the lowest
number ofcasualties during this period was Thursday.
Looking at collisions alone, as seen in Table 10, Friday had the highest number for
both the entire sample period and Pre-TSS period, that was eight and four respectively.
However, during the Post-TSS period, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Saturday had
the highest number of five each.
The result of the analysis show that the days having the highest number of
casualties changed between Pre-TSS and Post-TSS period. The trend ofthe day of most
frequent occurrence changed from Friday to Wednesday during the Pre-TSS to the Post-
TSS period respectively. Thus, the results of the analysis did not support the second
hypothesis.
Results ofFlag State of Ship Analysis
For the entire sample period, out of the one-hundred and eighteen ships that were
involved in marine casualties, forty-one of them were FOC ships as shown in Table 11.
This figure represents 35 percent ofall the ships involved during this period. Among the
FOC states, Panama had thirteen ships, closely followed by Liberia and Singapore with
nine ships each as shown in Table 12. The other FOC states that had significant number of
ships involved in casualties were Cyprus and Honduras, with four and three ships
respectively.
Since this study is about the SOM, then the two bordering countries' ships,
namely Indonesia and Malaysia, were expected to dominate involvement in marine
casualties. Besides the FOCs, the flags that had the highest number of ships involved in
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TABLE 10
RESULTS OF DAY OF INCIDENT ANALYSIS:
BREAKDOWN OF COLLISION INCIDENTS BY DAY
~~~;~~?~i}~~~;}:~:~L~~Ii~13;~:~:;J~3:1Z~~!l~~~~~~;!~;~=:~3:±~~~J~iI
Monday 5 1 5
Tuesday 5 - 5
Wednesday 6 1 5
Thursday 5 1 4
Fridav 7 4 3
Saturday 7 2 5
Sunday 6 2 4
No Data 4 4 -
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
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TABLE 11
RESULTS OF FLAG STATE ANALYSIS:
FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE PERIOD, PRE-TSS, AND POST-TSS
~.~J:op:: -::,~r~,' .~: : ; ; ~'~( ..~j. :~'-"~~=::~"/;':1-~'<~~ :~~~~~r~~~n-:.~;4_>]~~W?1~rrlj0~~~~~
~~~ I:.b ~~ ~'-~t ~I-!. I~- tt' ~.....l.}u1J~~ ~~r~~ ~~~,,-l~~I~r.~,;;ll!~.L
Greece 6 3 3
Indonesia 8 4 4
Japan 8 4 4
Malaysia 7 1 6
F.O.C. 41 9 32
Others 37 8 29
No Data 11 3 8
Total
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
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TABLE 12
RESULTS OF FLAG STATE ANALYSIS:
BREAKDOWN OF NUMBER OF FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE SHIP
~~~,f~~~~~lL~;:~~':';:t~~~~~~~2Gi[:~~£~
Bahamas 1 - 1
Bermuda 1 - 1
Cayman Islands - - -
Cyprus 4 2 2
Honduras 3 - 3
Liberia 9 4 5
Malta - - -
Panama 13 2 11
Singapore 9 1 8
Sri Lanka - - -
St. Lucia - - -
St. Vincent 1 - 1
Vanuatu - - -
Total 41 9 32
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
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marine casualties during the entire sample period were Japan and Indonesia, with eight
ships each. This was closely followed by Malaysia with seven ships, and Greece with six
ships. Ships registered in Malaysia and Indonesia represented 13 percent of the casualties .
On the other hand, Japanese registered ships made-up 7 percent. In addition, there were
thirty-seven ships that fell under the category of others, and another eleven did not provide
data on the Flag State.
As for the Pre-TSS period, out ofthe thirty-two ships, 28 percent were FOe ships.
Among the FOe ships, the highest incident rate was for Liberia with four ships, followed
by Cyprus and Panama with two ships each. Other than the FOe ships, the Flag State that
had the highest number of ships involved in marine casualties were Japan and Indonesia
with four ships each. This was followed by Greece and Malaysia with three and one ships
respectively. There were eight ships that fell under the category ofothers, and another
three did not provide data on the Flag State. In this period, ships registered in Malaysia
and Indonesia made-up 16 percent, whilst Japanese registered ships represented 13
percent.
For the Post-TSS period, there were eighty-six ships recording casualties . There
were thirty-two Foe ships reported in this period, representing 37 percent ofthe total
number of ships involved in marine casualties . The highest incident rate among the FOe
ships was Panama, with eleven ships, followed by Singapore with eight ships. In this
period, there were five ships with the Liberian registry, and the Honduran registry had
three ships.
Besides the Foe ships, Malaysia had the highest number with six ships. Japan and
Indonesia had four ships each, closely followed by Greece with three ships. There were
twenty-nine ships that fell under the category of others, and another eight were without
data on the Flag State. Ships registered in Malaysia and Indonesia that were involved in
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marine casualties represented 12 percent, whilst the percentage of Japanese registered
ships was 5 percent.
As can be seen from the analysis, the percentage ofFOC ships involved in marine
casualties increased from 28 to 37 percent during the Pre-TSS to the Post-TSS period .
However, ships that were registered in the littoral states ofMalaysia and Indonesia
decreased from 16 to 12 percent. In spite of increasing amounts ofcrude oil movements to
Japan, the percentage of Japanese registered ships dropped from 13 percent during Pre-
TSS period to 5 percent during Post-TSS period.
The results showed that the bulk of the ships involved during both the sub-periods
were FOC ships. Thus this analysis supported the second hypothesis that the trend in
marine casualties does not change with respect to the Flag State of the ships.
Results of Type of Ship Analysis
For the entire sample period, the results of the analysis showed that out of the one
hundred and eighteen ships that were involved in marine casualties, the bulk were
comprised of tankers, general cargo, and fishing vessels as shown in Table 13. There were
forty-five tankers, representing 38 percent ofthe total number of ships that were involved .
Besides tankers, there were also twenty-eight general cargo, thirteen fishing vessels, seven
bulk carriers, four containerships, and one passenger ship. In addition, there were fourteen
ships that were under the category ofothers, and another six ships involved did not have
sufficient data on the ship type. The ships categorized as others are shown in Table 14,
and consisted of three LPGs, three tugs, and two Naval Destroyers. In addition, the other
types of ship involved, with one incident each were a Car Carrier, Cement Carrier, LASH,
OBO, Reefer and RO-RO.
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TABLE 13
RESULTS OF SIDP TYPE ANALYSIS:
FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE PERIOD, PRE-TSS, AND POST-TSS
~~,~~~~;;~./~:~.;' ,:~~·~_:L:~.: I~~~~;.-~~I~::~:i::r.~~J;~~-n1fl;~~~::;~<~;;~fl~~~:~~1,:.J;Jv~.r~:.~:J,~~:~0r.~?i~~"'J!J.!i",~r ~,~-1 _':'~'_-~"':---- ,,,~ l~kJ~~~~_~;!grlb-J. ~~ ·1k -_,<h...,..~=-~~·Ii:'· ;'b -...,lU~t-'·L~--~ ~--!i"""~~':~
Bulk Carrier 7 - 7
Container 4 - 4
Fishing 13 1 12
General Cargo 28 9 19
Tanker 45 15 30
Passenger 1 - 1
Others 14 2 12
No Data 6 5 1
Total 118 32 86
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
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TABLE 14
RESULTS OF SHIP TYPE ANALYSIS:
BREAKDOWN OF OTHERS CATEGORY INTO TYPE OF SHIP
~;~·'F;~2:~:t·rlJ~i:~I~-;~;~~S?;·1:::::~::~~~~1[~:~u7t~:~~~~11lF.:.:~"r'CI'_i.."; >J;J=L "'..:~ ~" ,,: ; , :!!,,"")'<~! .11,..:'-':'. f.'i1_~ ,- .. :, :w>.:- ',"-'-. t -'. ~'\"::r':",,-~:.i" "l1.':'J.J .~"":.:_"-:_0.~ l:;.'-ll·o:':ill-."!.I~",, ! :lfI~d
Car Carrier 1 - 1
Cement Carrier 1
-
1
Destroyer 2 - 2
LASH 1 - 1
LPG 3 - 3
OBO 1 - 1
Reefer 1 1 -
RO-RO 1 - 1
Tugboat 3 1 2
Total 14 2 12
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
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In the Pre-TSS period, fifteen ofa total of thirty-two ships, representing 47
percent, were tankers. Beside tankers, there were nine general cargo, and one fishing
vessel. There were two ships in the category of others, which consisted of one reefer and
one tug. Two ofthe ships that were recorded during this period lacked data on ship type .
As for the Post-TSS period, tankers represented 35 percent of all the ships
recorded, that was, thirty ships out of a total of eighty-six. Other ships involved during
this period consisted of nineteen general cargo vessels, twelve fishing vessels, seven bulk
carriers, four containerships, and one passenger ship. There were twelve ships categorized
as others, and only one ship did not have sufficient data on ship type. The twelve ships
that fell under the category of others consisted of three LPGs, two Naval Destroyers, and
two tugs. In addition, a Car Carrier, Cement Carrier, LASH, OBO, and RO-RO
contributed one each to the statistics.
As can be seen from the results of the analysis, tankers dominated the type of ships
involved in the casualties during both the sub-periods. From Pre-TSS to Post-TSS period,
the percentage of tankers involved in the casualties dropped from 47 to 35 percent.
Assuming that the ratio of the type of ship involved in marine casualties was proportional
to the composition ofeach type of ship that made-up the traffic volume, then the results of
this analysis indicated a likelihood of tankers casualties. Previous records indicated that 35
percent of the traffic movements in the SOM involved tankers.
The results of this analysis supported the second hypothesis regarding the trend of
marine casualties, especially with respect the type of ships. Basically, ship types involved
in marine casualties remained the same, and were mostly tankers.
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Results of Size of Ship Analysis
For this analysis, the sizes of ships were divided into five categories by GRT. Ships
of 50,000 GRT and greater were considered to be large ships. A ship's GRT should be an
indicator to which trade the ship was trading in, such as a coastal trade, home trade, or
foreign trades . Coastal trades and home trades involved ships flying either the Malaysia,
Indonesia, or Singapore flag. The trade of the ships also reflected the competency level of
the officers manning the ships. Normally, foreign going licensed officers were more
competent than home trade and coastal trade officers.
During the entire sample period, a total of one hundred and eighteen ships were
reported to be involved in marine casualties. Out of this, nine did not have data on the
ship's GRT. Thus, they were reported under the no data category. The category that
reported the highest number of ships involved in casualties was 5,00 I - 50,000 GRT, with
a total of forty-four ships. The second highest category with twenty-three ships was 501 -
5,000 GRT. There were eight ships, representing 8 percent, that fell under the category of
above 100,000 GRT, and was the least frequent occurrence among all categories as shown
in Table 15.
During the Pre-TSS period, a total of thirty-two ships reported involvement in
marine casualties, and fourteen of these ships were in the category of 5,00} - 50,000
GRT. This represented 44 percent of the ships involved in marine casualties and it was the
highest among all categories. There were four ships recorded in the category below 500
GRT, which was the second highest among all the categories. There were three ships,
representing 9 percent, in the category of above 100,000 GRT. In the category of 50,001
- 100,000 GRT, there was only one ship reported, which is the lowest among all the
categories. Another seven of the ships reported in this period did not have any data on
GRT. They are classified under the no data category.
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TABLE 15
RESULTS OF SHIP SIZE ANALYSIS:
FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE PERIOD, PRE-TSS, AND POST-TSS
~~~~;r:;:": ~; :: :~~:'2~; :"'~~ab.; - !f;~:~ ~~.~~ -~::-i~~' : ~~:g:~.I~~1SF~0~~ I~~::'~~~~~~·1i~~~~~~~:~ I ~ I~'~~~·"~'~~~'- .l._ Ei~.b l" ~.~:c.~~L~ ·': ~ "~~~'J ':k~~.::V0~~, -:> ~· ·:: ,._~~~. ~. ~
< 500 14 4 10
501 - 5,000 23 3 20
5,001 - 50,000 44 14 30
50,001 - 100,000 10 1 9
> 100,000 8 3 5
No Data 19 7 12
Total 118 32 86
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
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As for the Post-TSS period, there were eighty-six ships reported, and the category
of5,001 - 50,000 GRT had the highest number with thirty ships. This figure represented
35 percent of all the ships involved in marine casualties during this period, followed by
the 501 - 5,000 GRT category with twenty ships. The lowest among all the categories
was above 100,000 GRT, with five ships, representing only 6 percent of all the ships
involved during this period. Twelve ships reported under no data category.
In the 5,001 - 50,000 GRT category, there was an increase from 14 to 30 in the
number of ships involved in marine casualties during Pre-TSS to Post-TSS. However, in
terms of its percentage share, it dropped from 44 to 35 percent. This situation was the
same for ships in the category of above 100,000 GRT. In the latter case, the number
increased from three to five, but the percentage dropped from 9 to 6 percent. However,
the situation was different in the categories of 501 - 5,000 & 50,001 - 100,000 GRT. In
these categories, the number and percentage of ships involved in marine casualties
increased. In the case of501-5,000 GRT category, the number increased from three to
twenty. In terms of percentage share, it increased from 9 to 23 percent. This represented
the highest increase in terms of percentage share among all categories from the Pre-TSS
to the Post-TSS period. As for the 50,001-100,000 GRT category, the figure increased
from one to nine, with percentage increase from 3 to 10 percent.
As defined earlier, ships greater than 50,000 GRT were considered as large ships.
Ships in this category increased both in number and percentage from 4 to 14 and 12 to 16
respectively, during the Pre-TSS to Post-TSS period. The SOM are full of shallow waters.
The requirements recommended for deep-draft ships navigating in the SOM seem to show
positive results with a decline in percentage share in the above 100,000 GRT category,
from 9 to 6 percent during Pre-TSS to Post-TSS period.
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Considering the result of the analysis, the trend of the marine casualties with
respect to the size of ship did not change. In fact, it remained the same and thus this
analysis supported the second hypothesis.
Results of Age of Ship Analysis
In the entire sample period, out of the one hundred and eighteen ships reported,
twenty-seven of them were without data on the year built . There were twenty-three ships
reported under the 0 - 5 years age group. It was the highest for this period and it
represented 19 percent of the total number of ships as shown in Table 16. This was closely
followed by twenty-one ships in the 16 - 20 year age grouping, and twenty ships in the
11 - 15 year age grouping. The above 20 years age grouping, with twelve ships,
represented the lowest among groups.
There were thirty-two ships reported during the Pre-TSS period, thirteen of them
did not have data on the year built. The age group with the highest number of ships
involved in marine casualties was 6 - 10 years, with seven ships representing 22 percent of
all the ships reported during this period. It was closely followed by six ships in the 0 - 5
years age group, followed by four ships in the 11 - 15 years age group. The lowest among
all the age groups was the 16 - 20 years, and above 20 years with only one ship each. In
this period, ships below 10 years old dominated the statistics, with thirteen ships,
representing 41 percent of all the ships reported during the Pre-TS S period. On the other
hand, ships above 15 years old represented 6 percent ofthe total number of ships in this
period. It is safe to conclude, that during this period, newer ships especially those less than
10 years old were more prone to marine casualties. Assuming that the number of ships in
the age group involved in the marine casualty represented a similar proportion of the age
group of the traffic volume in the SOM, then it can be assumed that most of the ships
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TABLE 16
RESULTS OF AGE OF SHIP ANALYSIS:
FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE PERIOD, PRE-TSS, AND POST-TSS
~~c~i::2?!~~t!,<,J,~c;~,;~"cr';',r~c~~~~!1:11}'r:~:i!vr~{~~;~~:'r;
~~~~lS.{'~
0- 5 Years 23 6 17
6 - 10 Years 15 7 8
11 - 15 Years 20 4 16
16 - 20 Years 21 1 20
> 20 Years 12 1 11
No Data 27 13 14
Total 118 32 86
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department of
Environment, and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
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are newer and of less than 10 years old.
As for the Post-TSS period, out of the eighty-six ships reported in this period,
fourteen of them were without any information on the year built. In this period, the 16 - 20
years age group had the highest number ofships, twenty which represented 23 percent. It '
was followed by seventeen ships in the 0 - 5 years age group, and there were sixteen
ships in the 11 - 15 years age group. The lowest among all the age groups was 6 - 10
years, with only eight ships reported under this age group. There were twenty-five ships
with less than 10 years, which represented 29 percent, and there were thirty-one ships
above 15 years old, which represented 36 percent. The Post-TSS period saw a decline in
the percentage of newer ships of less than 10 years old involved in marine casualties. It
declined from 41 to 29 percent from the Pre-TSS to Post-TSS period. However, older
ships of more than 15 years increased from 6 percent in Pre-TSS to 36 percent during
Post-TSS period. Assuming earlier assumption are correct, then the major composition of
the traffic volume in the SOM shifted from the newer ships of less than 10 years old
during the Pre-TSS period, to ships of more than 15 years old in the Post-TSS period.
The results of this analysis rejected the second hypothesis since it revealed that the
trend with respect the age of ships dominating marine casualties changes from the Pre-
TSS to Post-TSS periods.
Results ofType of Casualty Analysis
For the entire sample period, eighty-nine of the one hundred and eighteen ships
reported were involved in collisions, which represented a staggering 75 percent. As shown
in Table 17, next to collision, there were eleven cases ofgroundings, and six cases of
founderings. The lowest among all the type of marine casualties was touching bottom,
with three cases. However, five of the ships reported were under the category ofothers,
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TABLE 17
RESULTS OF TYPE OF CASUALTY ANALYSIS:
FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE PERIOD, PRE-TSS, AND POST-TSS
rp: ::,·:·.~.,"':L:, :1,:,~,;:~ ,:[¥':/ij?:'!":;r-'" <;,~~:~,';"'i;:~>-Ji:~~.W l f ;~:Z4>i:::}~~:~~::: - ;~JF.V-;1··;:7::;·;ii--:S.:~:~~:'f~~t;~!jf.:;]!~~
'l:i " .1 ·--,-; .. ···-···,' p·7~-,;:-~ \ "d'::-:'1Ti"--:; '0"?tr"t'ii'"" '! =':" J " ,~r;:1 ! T '1~ ,•. "' 1" ' . .--.. ~-.L;'iLjlT:>'~ ' ~ I . ~I.· j
J.1•..:.2.~~'I ....'J~~ ~~ :-t~ r~~~~ -,, ~ ~;"_~ L1.J_~~J:O. ~~ -_~ !:_ .~ :~:-::s_::.i ;.c.,.~..t~ill]
Collision 89 26 63
Grounding 11 3 8
Foundering 6 - 6
Fire 4 2 2
Touching Bottom 3 1 2
Others 5 - 5
Total 118 32 86
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department,
Author's Calculation .
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which included four cases of explosions, and one case of striking rock.
During the Pre-TSS period, of the total thirty-two ships reported, twenty-six of
them were involved in collisions. This figure represented 81 percent of all casualties
reported. Next to collision, there were three groundings and two fires. The lowest among
all the categories were founderings, and others, with no incidents at all.
As for the Post-TSS period, there were sixty-three ships involved in the collisions,
out of the total eighty-six ships reported. This represented 73 percent of all the types of
marine casualties involved during the Post-TSS period. In addition, there were eight
groundings and six founderings. The lowest among all types of casualties were fires and
touching bottom, with two cases reported under each category. All five cases reported
under the category of others, during the entire sample period, occurred during the Post-
TSS period.
As can be seen from this analysis, collisions dominated the type of casualty.
Although, the percentage dropped from 81 to 73 percent from the Pre-TSS to the Post-
TSS period, the figures remained staggering . Grounding remain second to collision with a
constant 9 percent, during both the periods. Based on the results, trends in marine
casualties did not change, and remained the same with respect to the type of casualty.
Thus, this analysis of the type of casualty supported the second hypothesis .
Results ofLocation of Casualty
For the entire sample period, there were seventy-six incidents, involving a total of
one hundred and eighteen ships as shown in Table 18 and 19. The layout of specific areas'
location can be seen in figure 3 on page 57. There were fifty-four ships involved in thirty
incidents in Area 5, and collision alone involved twenty-four ofthose incidents as shown
in Table 20. Area 5 had the highest number of ships involved in marine casualties, in both
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TABLE 18
RESULTS OF LOCATION OF CASUALTY ANALYSIS:
FOR ALL SHIPS INVOLVED IN MARINE CASUALTIES BY AREA
fs~{~~~~~~t~:I:f:;D3::~'V:~M~tl<:~:~~~~~r1;~:·JG:;:l~il~~~~&.-1,:~!:;'.::- :~~~?~~;I~~~;~0:Bfi~1
1 7 1 6
2 25 6 19
3 7 1 6
4 11 2 9
5 54 15 39
No Data 14 7 7
Total 118 32 86
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
87
TABLE 19
RESULTS OF LOCATION OF CASUALTY ANALYSIS:
FOR ALL INCIDENTS BY AREA
f.~;·.;{\;~;~-~~·-;~~·~:~~~.:>~:~~·:1~~~1;f~{j~-:;l~~j : ~:-~1&:;~:}~ ' :-i :f::~~i ~?i
1 7 1 6
2 19 5 14
3 5 1 4
4 6 1 5
5 30 8 22
No Data 9 5 4
Total 76 21 55
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
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TABLE 20
RESULTS OF LOCATION OF CASUALTY ANALYSIS:
FOR COLLISION INCIDENTS BY AREA
~~~~; ~:~~~~; ~~~.~ ~.~~~ 'J[~~1;~L~{~~i:~~[~:i;~: :~7~~'~l(:S§~~f1j~m
1 -
- -
2 8 3 5
3 3 1 2
4 5 1 4
5 24 7 17
No Data 6 3 3
Total 46 15 31
Source: Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, Malaysian Department ofEnvironment,
and Malaysian Federal Marine Department.
Author's Calculation.
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the categories ofcollision and all incidents . With respect to percentage share, 46 percent
of the ships involved in marine casualties occurred in Area 5. As in the case ofcollision,
52 percent of them occurred in Area 5. Next to Area 5, there were twenty-five ships
involved in nineteen incidents in Area 2. Only eight of those nineteen incidents were
collisions. The areas that had the lowest number of ships involved in marine casualties
happened in Area 1 and Area 3. Each of these areas had seven ships involved in marine
casualties. In addition, there were fourteen ships under the no data category.
For the Pre-TSS period, there were thirty-two ships reported involving twenty-two
incidents, fifteen of which were collisions. Fifteen ships, that represented 47 percent of the
total during this period, happened in Area 5, which was the highest among all the areas.
These fifteen ships involved eight incidents, seven ofwhich were collisions, which
represented 88 percent. Next to Area 5, there were six ships involved in marine casualties
in Area 2. These six ships, involved five incidents, with three in collisions. The areas with
the lowest incident rates were Area 1 and Area 3, with only one ship involved. During this
period, seven of the ships reported fell under the category of no data .
As for the Post-TSS period, there were eighty-six ships reported involving fifty-
five incidents. Thirty-one of these incidents, representing 56 percent, were collisions.
There were thirty-nine ships involved in marine casualties that occurred in Area 5, which
was the highest among all the areas. These thirty-nine ships were involved in twenty-two
incidents, with seventeen ofthem being collisions, representing 77 percent. The second
highest area that marine casualties took place was in Area 2, with a total of nineteen ships
involved . There were nineteen ships, involving in fourteen incidents, five ofwhich were
collisions. The areas with the lowest incident rates were Area 1 and Area 3, with each
involving six ships. For Area 1, there were six ships involved in six incidents other that
collision. On the other hand, the six ships in Area 3 were involved in four incidents, and
two of them were collisions .
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During both the sub-periods, Area 5 had the highest number of ships involved in
marine casualties as well as collisions. The rankings of the other areas are also similar for
both the periods. Based on the results of this analysis, the trend of marine casualties, with
respect to the location, during both the Pre-TSS and the Post-TSS periods did not change.
Thus, this location analysis supported the second hypothesis.
Overall Results ofThe Marine Casualty Analysis
The testing of the second hypothesis ofthis study depended on a consensus of the
overall results of the analysis ofalI variables. As can be seen in Table 21, out of the eight
variables analyzed, five of them supported the second hypothesis. The five variables that
provided support for the hypothesis were Flag State of ship, type ofship, size ofship, type
of casualty, and location of incident. On the other hand, the three variables that allowed
for a rejection of the hypothesis were month of incident, day ofincident, and age of ship.
Considering the consensus of the analysis, this study supported the second hypothesis that
the TSS did not have any effect on the trend ofmarine casualties that happened in the
SOM.
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TABLE 21
OVERALL RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS:
FOR TESTING THE SECOND HYPOTHESIS
Month of Incident X
Day ofIncident X
Flag State of Ship X
Type of Ship X
Size of Ship X
Age of Ship X
Type of Casualty X
Location ofIncident X
Total 5 3
Source: Author's Calculation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
This study set out to examine and assess the level of navigational safety in the
congested SOM. It did so by reviewing available published research into the dynamics of
assessing the risk ofmarine casualty. Once the methodology for analysis was established,
this study looked at navigational safety standards in other geographic areas. Other area's
standards served as a yardstick, to gauge the level of safety in the SOM. The geographic
areas with better safety standards acted as a role models for SOM to adopt and follow.
Since this study involved the SOM, a highly traveled waterway used by ships ofall
nations, legal aspects in the context ofUNCLOS III cannot be ignored. This study
explored all possibilities allowed for a littoral state (Malaysia) to enhance the safety of
navigation in the SOM. Relevant aspects of regulatory regimes, and ship management and
operations were also explored to ascertain prevailing weaknesses so that appropriate
recommendations could be made to improve the situation.
It is said that "safety is everybody business", but the burden is more heavily on the
states bordering the SOM, such as Malaysia and Indonesia. This study also noted that
Malaysia 's effort alone was not sufficient to enhance the safety ofnavigation in the SOM.
The problem of safety of navigation in the SOM has to be dealt with jointly at local,
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regional, and international levels. Thus, only concerted efforts by all nations can enhance
the safety of navigation in the SOM.
The first hypothesis of this study was that there was a positive relationship
between traffic movements and the number of marine casualties despite the
implementation ofTSS in the SOM. The other hypothesis was concerned with the trends
of maritime casualties. It was hypothesized that the trend did not change before and after
the implementation of the TSS. This study began by looking at the site and regulatory
regimes, and then tested via analyses the hypotheses.
In this study, the site is the SOM, and Chapter One is concerned with site. It
began by looking at the history of the SOM. To historians, the importance of the SOM
needs no further introduction, as it is claimed that the history of the SOM is actually the
history of the region. Later, the chapter described the SOM in more detail by looking at
the Geographical Description, Weather, and Tidal Currents. Towards the end ofthe
chapter, it introduced the Navigation Problems, Shipping Traffic, and the Traffic
Separation Scheme.
It is worth noting that the "strategic location" of the SOM cannot be disputed.
Because of its strategic location, shipping traffic has been increasing over the years which
in turn has resulted in marine casualties. However, it is rather fortunate that the prevailing
weather in the SOM is not as severe as compared to other areas such as the North Sea.
The SOM has been serving as a "nerve" for the flow of energy to Japan. In 1993, on
average more than half a million tons of crude oil passed the SOM on its way to Japan to
provide the energy.
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Shipping traffic congestion in the SaM has been known to the shipping committee,
and the IMeO as early as 1960s. After a series of requests by the littoral states of
Malaysia and Indonesia, and followed by long deliberation, the TSS was finally
implemented on May 1, 1981. The main objective of the TSS was to organize the traffic
flow, and thus reduce the number of marine casualties in the SaM. The results of this
study revealed that the TSS is not improving the situation in the SaM, but it cannot
confirm whether the situation would not have been worse without the TSS. It should be
noted that TSS in the SaM does not cover the entire Straits. It is only available in two
locations, in the vicinity of the One Fathom Bank, and the western approach to Singapore
Straits, at the southern tip of the SaM. Based on the results of this study, an expansion of
the TSS to cover the entire SaM is long overdue.
The second chapter of this study reviewed the regulatory regimes. It noted that
most shipping conventions are formulated as the result of marine casualties. Basically, the
results of serious Marine casualty investigations usually make concrete recommendations
to prevent similar incidents in future . Sometimes new conventions are merely upgraded
adaptations ofprevious conventions.
The incident ofDiego Silang. in the SaM in 1976, accelerated the adoption of
Resolution A 476 (XII), "Navigation through the Straits ofMalacca and Singapore." As a
regional cooperation among the littoral states, the TTEG was formed in June 1973. The
TTEG was charged to undertake a study on the need and formulation ofTSS, in the
SaM. The first biggest achievement of the TTEG was when the TSS came into force in
the SaM in May 1, 1995.
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The Coastal States' Regulations explain among others the duties and
responsibilities of the Flag State. Over the years it has been noted that some Flag states
even go to the extent of lowering their safety requirements to attract and encourage
shipowners to register under their flag. This action promotes the increasing number of
substandard ships sailing the oceans today. In order to check on the lowering of the safety
requirements of some Flag States and the desire to eliminate substandard ships, there is a
need for IMO to implement Port State Control on a global basis.
Notable conventions adopted by IMO as ofMay 5, 1994, were listed, and the eight
conventions acceded to by Malaysia at this juncture were also highlighted. Another aspect
that needs serious consideration is the Grandfather Clause, as it compromises safety on
existing ships especially of older ships . As it stands, existing ships can continue to operate
under dispensation by refit or refurbishment, to meet increasing safety standards as they
develop. This situation becomes acceptable as a compromise, because of industry
pressure, and thus technically there is no end to the continued use of existing lower
standard ships .
The main issue with respect to safety in the SOM is the existence of substandard
ships managed by substandard operators, and the underlying cause is economics. Low
financial returns do not justify new shipbuilding, resulting in the aging of the world fleet.
Cost cutting in response to commercial pressure has led to a decline in the quality of ship
management. Ethical values of maintaining a well-found ship and crew are being traded for
quick financial returns. The solution to this can only be resolved at the international level
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as safe and reliable shipping is associated with the proper implementation of international
conventions.
To make the situation worse, overtonnaging has resulted in stiff competition that
pushes down the freight rates . With low freight rates, it is impossible for shipowners to
operate ships efficiently. In order for a ship to continue to operate, Ship Management has
decided to start cutting comers. As a result, ship operating expenses are slashed, and the
main areas affected by this are the manning and maintenance of the ships. Since
shipowners cannot offer decent salaries to attract a highly competent crew, they acquire
cheap crews from the third world countries. These crew members, even if they get minimal
training, still have much to be desired . To cater the needs of the training requirements,
IMO came out with the STCW 1978. On the other hand, with limited budgets for
maintenance, the ships not be properly maintained, causing deterioration of the ship much
earlier than expected.
Towards the end of Chapter Two, the characteristics of navigation in the SOM
were outlined. The availability of the necessary ingredients or components for a potential
major catastrophic disaster is obvious. The needs of ship routing in TSS are discussed, and
one of the components of ship routing should include a ship reporting system.
The analysis of this study was covered in Chapter Three. That chapter began by
looking at the important role of the SOM. The safety of navigation in the SOM has
become more crucial with the development of tourist resorts along the fringes of the
Straits. Marine casualties resulting in major events ofcatastrophic nature, such as oil
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pollution, will seriously affect the tourist resorts, and thus increase the need for a safer
SOM.
The compilation ofdata for this study was very difficult, and was done in bits and
pieces. There is no authority entrusted to compile or keep records of the data. The results
of the frequency rates of the marine casualty's analysis revealed that the SOM was safer
than Tokyo Bay, Japan, and Humber Seaway, UK, in terms of the mean frequency rate. As
for the level of safety ofnavigation in terms of the marine casualty frequency rate, this
study showed that the SOM was also below the level of the open North Sea area.
However, the North Sea happens to be the busiest traversed area in the world. The
probability of the occurrence of marine casualties was much lower in the open North Sea
area as compared to the SOM. With an increasing number of traffic movements and the
high probability of the occurrence of marine casualties, the SOM is in dire need of
mitigating measures to enhance the safety of navigation.
The analysis to test the second hypothesis regarding the trends of the marine
casualties made use ofeight variables. The results of this analysis revealed that reduced
visibility due to the Sumatras, that are common during the Southwest Monsoon, was not a
factor that contributed to marine casualties. Furthermore, most of the marine casualties
did not happened during the weekends, contrary to what has been widely claimed .
As expected this study revealed that the bulk of the ships that were involved in
marine casualties were Foe ships, with Panama having the most ships. Since tankers
comprise a third of the traffic movements in the SOM, the results also showed that tankers
had the highest number of ships that were involved in casualties. In terms of size, the
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highest was in the 5,001 - 50,000 GRT category. Contrary to what was expected, the age
group that has the highest number of ships involved in marine casualties was the a- 5
years age grouping. With respect to the type of casualty, what was expected most because
of traffic congestion was collision, and it was in fact the highest among all casualties. The
location area that had the most casualties is Area 5, it was in fact the area expected to
show the most occurrences.
This study highlighted the problem of an ever increasing number of traffic
movements in the SOM. It has increased two fold during the study period from 1982 to
1993. Besides the inherent problems of the SOM, this study has brought into focus four
components of major catastrophic potential namely:
i) increasing number of traffic movements;
ii) probability of the occurrence of marine casualty is worse than the busiest
traversed area in the world;
iii) more than half a million tons of crude oil pass through the Straits on each
day, and
iv) the existing TSS is not sufficient to cope with the increased traffic volume.
Considering the findings of this study, present conditions in the SOM require
mitigating measures to enhance the safety of navigation . Hopefully, mitigating measures
upon implementation will be able to make the SOM a safer and cleaner environment for
the shipping community.
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Recommendations
This paper has brought into focus some pertinent safety issues of the SOM. Ever
increasing traffic movements in the SOM indicate an imminent need for the Malaysian
authority to consider adopting the following recommendations. The recommendations,
based on the results of this study, will be make under four broad categories namely traffic
movements, routing systems, regulatory regimes, and user fees.
Traffic Movements
There is a need to reduce the traffic movements in the SOM. Malaysia controls
Malaysian generated traffic, principally coastal shipping plying between Peninsular ports
fringing the SOM and Eastern Malaysian ports. This constitutes about 10 percent of the
total traffic movements in the SOM. It is recommended that Malaysia should adopt "Port
Rationalization" policy. The idea here is that any trading between Peninsular Malaysia and
East Malaysia should only make use of the port on the east coast ofPeninsular Malaysia
such as Kuantan, or Pasir Gudang. By doing this, the number of coastal ships plying in the
SOM will be reduced. To facilitate the movements of cargoes to and from these ports,
railways and lorries should be utilized for the transportation ofdry cargoes including bulk.
As for liquid cargoes, road tankers and railroads should be used for small parcels. As for
large quantities, Malaysia should consider constructing pipelines, similar to those used in
other parts of the world.
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Routing Systems
The results of this study showed that the existing TSS in the SOM is not sufficient
any longer to cope with increasing traffic movements. First and foremost, existing
coverage of the TSS should be expanded if possible to cover the entire SOM. This
recommendation will face strong opposition by many user states. However, minimum
coverage should be Area 5, from the One Fathom Bank to the southern tip of the SaM. In
addition to the TSS, Malaysia should consider introducing a Vessel Traffic Services
(VTS) which has been previously considered. The VTS should at least include a
mandatory Ship Reporting System. Two new ports have recently been opened in the
SaM, namely Malacca Refinery and Lumut Port. Given this situation, it is highly
recommended that Malaysia should seriously consider introducing a special corridor for
the use of coastal shipping and development of future ports.
Regulatory Regimes
As for the regulatory regimes, it is recommended that Malaysia should at the very
minimum consider the followings recommendations:
i) To develop coastal state regulations to control navigation according to
acceptable international laws and practice .
ii) To implement PSC inspections and to develop and cooperate in implementing
PSC on a regional basis (ASIA-PACIFIC).
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iii) To be proactive in the development ofIMO Conventions with regard to
overcoming the problems arising out of the Grandfather Clause.
iv) To overcome the weakness arising from human element of ship manning by
promoting the proper training and certification ofcrews and by promoting the
development of a responsible ship management systems.
v) To introduce additional regulatory measures to improve the routing of ships, in
order to minimize collision possibilities.
User Fees
According to part two of Article 26 ofUNCLOS III, "charges may be levied upon
a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea as payment only for specific services
rendered to the ship, and these charges shall be levied without discrimination ." It is very
clearly stated that the coastal states cannot collect toll for the usage of the territorial sea.
With the increasing number of traffic movements in the SaM, Malaysia together with
Indonesia should request for the existence ofcompulsory pilotage in the SaM. This
request will face very strong opposition by the shipowners, because it will result in an
increase in ship operating costs. In this regard, Malaysia should provide an option of
granting an exemption to ships whose Master has attended a SaM Simulator Course, at
the Maritime Academy, in Malaysia. In this respect, the Maritime Academy should
incorporate within their existing Radar Simulator two way traffic patterns for the
navigable passage in the SaM. In addition to pilotage, Malaysia should consider providing
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transiting ships with AImed Security Services, as a precautionary measure against piracy
that is quite rampant in the SOM. As for the charges, in addition to pilotage and armed
security, there is an additional fee for having oil pollution equipment on stand-by for any
eventuality. Malaysia and Indonesia should propose a non-profit making organization to
provide these services so as to reduce the cost to a minimum by only covering operating
cost. No doubt that in the beginning, there will be a lot of resistance to this, especially
from the shipowners. However, if the cost is not too high, in the long-run it will be
accepted. When the user fees become mandatory in the SOM, the shipowner has the
option not to use SOM, and instead use the Lombok Strait.
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